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Class actions are on the ropes. Courts in recentyears have ramped up the standards
governing the certification of damages classes and created new standing requirementsfor
consumer class actions. Most recently, in Wal-Mart v Dukes, the Supreme Court
articulateda new and highly restrictive interpretationof the commonality requirementof
Rule 23(a). But all of this pales in comparison to the Court's April 2011 decision in
AT&T Mobility v Concepcion, broadly validatingarbitrationprovisions containingclass
action waivers. The precise reach of Concepcion warrants close scrutiny. Our analysis
suggests that following Concepcion, some plaintiffs will be able to successfully challenge
class waivers under certain circumstances.Also, the new Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau-ifit is not stillborn at the hands of hostile congressionalmidwives-is likely to
eliminatesome class action waivers in the financialservices field. But most class cases will
not survive the impending tsunami of class action waivers. And as this great mass of
consumer protection, antitrust, employment, and other cases is swept out to sea, the
question arises:What or who can fill the resultingenforcement gap?
And here, we would hope to see the "privateattorney general" role assumed by
class action lawyers over the past several decades give way to a world in which state
attorneys general make unprecedented use of their parens patriae authority. Insulated
from the threats posed by class action waivers and restrictive class action standing
doctrine,attorneys general are now uniquely positioned to represent the interests of their
citizens in the very consumer, antitrust, wage-and-hour,and other cases that have long
provided the staple of private class action practice. And to tackle complex cases,
underfunded attorney general offices will make use of the private class action lawyers
who have acquiredexpertise in originating,investigating,and prosecuting class cases. Of
course, there are political risks here-given the model's dependency on contingent fee
arrangements-but there are also substantial political benefits, as attorneys general
around the country begin to take leadership positions in the sort of complex, big-ticket
cases that are likely to contribute meaningfully to state coffers-and redress the injuries of
consumers and employees who would otherwise have no recourse in a post-Concepcion
world.
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INTRODUCTION

There is a deep tradition of private involvement in the
enforcement of public laws in America. Most famously,
appropriating the English common law posse comitatus, we made the

"sheriff's posse" a ubiquitous and signature feature of law
enforcement in the postbellum western and southern United States.'
And it wasn't a sudden taste for centralized public enforcement that
drove the posses out of business; rather, it was private
entrepreneurs -principally Allan Pinkerton, whose eponymous
private agency rightly inferred from the proliferation of posses that
local governments were underfunded and overmatched. Supplanting

loosely organized groups of private citizens with tightly controlled
private employees, Pinkerton thrived, developing many of the most

1 See Sean J. Kealy, Reexamining the Posse Comitatus Act: Toward a Right to Civil Law
Enforcement, 21 Yale L & Pol Rev 383, 389, 394 (2003).
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important tools of modem law enforcement, such as undercover
work, and spawning the private detective industry.'
If less cinematic, the role of private actors in the enforcement of
public civil laws has been no less robust. Enacted during the Civil
War, the False Claims Act3 (FCA) revived the ancient English
practice of qui tam, and the use of "bounty," as a way to enlist
whistleblowers and private lawyers to ferret out frauds against the
government.' A similar concept is at work in the Civil Rights Act of
1964,' the citizen-suit provisions of US environmental law,6 and, for
that matter, throughout the entire panoply of federal and state
remedial statutes that incent private enforcement with attorney's fee
provisions.' Over the past fifty years in particular, we have come to
assume, quite correctly, that private actors will be the frontline
enforcers in actions redressing broadscale securities fraud, consumer

2 See Frank Morn, "The Eye That Never Sleeps": A History of the Pinkerton National
Detective Agency 151-63 (Indiana 1982).
3
Act of Mar 2, 1863, 12 Stat 696, codified as amended at 31 USC §§ 3729-33.
4
See 12 Stat at 698 (noting that where the government has been defrauded a "suit may
be brought and carried on by any person, as well for himself as for the United States"). The
FCA, which authorizes the government to bring civil actions against anyone who presents a
false money claim, contains a qui tam enforcement provision, whereby private citizens with
independent knowledge of fraud perpetrated against the government may sue to recover the
fruits of the fraud. See 31 USC § 3730(b)(1). Under the qui tam provisions of the FCA, any
person may bring a civil action "for the person and for the United States Government" to
recover damages and penalties. See 31 USC § 3730(b)(1).
5
Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 241, codified as amended at 42 USC § 2000e et seq. In one of
the first cases construing the 1964 Act, the Supreme Court held, "A [public accommodations]
suit is thus private in form only.... If [a plaintiff] obtains an injunction, he does so not for
himself alone but also as a 'private attorney general,' vindicating a policy that Congress
considered of the highest priority." Newman v Piggie Park Enterprises,Inc, 390 US 400, 401-02
(1968) ("When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident that enforcement would
prove difficult and that the Nation would have to rely in part upon private litigation as a means
of securing broad compliance with the law.").
6
Environmental citizen-suit provisions generally authorize any "citizen," defined as "a
person or persons having an interest which is or may be adversely affected," to commence suit
to enforce statutory requirements against violators, or to require the government to perform a
mandatory duty under the statute. See, for example, 33 USC § 1365(g) (defining "citizen" for
the purposes of the Clean Water Act). Citizen-suit provisions were first included in the Clean
Air Act. See Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 304, Pub L No 91-604, 84 Stat 1676, 1706,
codified at 42 USC § 7604 (authorizing private citizens to sue other persons or the government
to enforce the emissions standards established by the Clean Air Act). For a comprehensive
listing of environmental citizen-suit provisions, see Cass Sunstein, What's Standing after Lujan?
Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article II, 91 Mich L Rev 163, 165 n 11 (1992).
7
See, for example, The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub L No 94-559,
90 Stat 2641, codified at 42 USC § 1988. See also Myriam Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform
Litigation. Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 Colum L Rev 1384,
1420-21 (2000).
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fraud and deceptive trade practices, antitrust violations (outside the
merger context), civil rights violations, and many other areas.8
We expect no less. Private involvement in public civil law
enforcement is deeply embedded in our politics and culture. State
and local enforcement agencies in particular (and many federal ones,
too9) are funded and organized on the clear, if largely unspoken,
understanding that a vigorous and well-stocked private bar sits ready
to deploy its ample resources to redress frauds and other harms
perpetrated upon the general public. One can imagine a world
where public agencies assume primary (or even sole) responsibility
for the detection, investigation, and litigation of public frauds, as well
as the collection of ill-gotten gains and the distribution of
compensation to injured persons. But then, as any state attorney
general (AG) will tell you, one would be imagining a very different
world-one that provides orders of magnitude more resources to
state and local enforcement agencies.
In modern times, the principal means whereby private actors
seek to redress public harms is the class action-a device that has
become steeped in controversy. The issue is not so much the
effectiveness of the class tool; after all, class actions have recovered
untold tens of billions of dollars for injured parties, establishing
deterrents that critics often complain are overly effective." Rather,
the cri de coeur of the class action critics is "agency costs" - and

more specifically, the concern that class practice allows private
lawyers to assume the representation of vast sets of absent plaintiffs
and to use that power, monitored by no one except overworked
judges, as a club with which to extract massive settlements from riskaverse corporations."
Merited or not, the agency cost critique has certainly ushered in
a backlash, spurring-among other things -significant restrictions in
See Pamela H. Bucy, PrivateJustice, 76 S Cal L Rev 1, 12-13 (2002).
9 See Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and Securities
Enforcement, 11 Conn Ins L J 107, 126-27 (2005) ("Because the SEC lacks adequate resources
to effectively police the national securities market, supplemental enforcement is essential to
achieve an appropriate level of deterrence.").
10 See Mark E. Budnitz, The Federalization and Privatization of Public Consumer
Protection Law in the United States: Their Effect on Litigation and Enforcement, 24 Ga St U L
Rev 663, 664 (2008) ("Recognizing the resource limitations of government agencies, many
consumer laws provide a private right of action so individual consumers also can litigate
violations of these laws. Many of these laws also provide class actions and statutory damages
which encourage consumers to act as 'private attorneys general.').
11 See Myriamn Gilles and Gary Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs
Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U Pa L Rev 103, 155-59 (2006)
(discussing academic critiques of class actions).
12 See id.
8
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the rules governing the certification of both damages and injunctive
classes, as well as the creation of new limitations upon standing,
particularly in consumer class actions."
And then there is the coup de grace administered to consumer
class actions by a 5-4 Supreme Court this past term in AT&T
Mobility LLC v Concepcion.' All of the doctrinal developments of
recent years circumscribing the reach of class actions pale in import
next to the game-changing edict that companies with possible
exceptions that warrant close scrutiny may simply opt out of
potential liability by incorporating class action waiver language in
their standard form contracts with consumers (or employees or
others). As we presaged in a 2005 article," the Supreme Court's
ruling suggests that many-indeed, most-of the companies that
touch consumers' day-to-day lives can and will now place themselves
beyond the reach of aggregate litigation. 6 These companies include
telephone companies, internet service providers, credit card issuers,
payday lenders, mortgage lenders, health clubs, nursing homes, retail
banks, investment banks, mutual funds, and the sellers of all manner
of goods and services. And that is just consumers. Employees, too,
will find themselves unable to band together and seek legal redress."
13 See John C. Coffee Jr and Stefan Paulovic, Class Certification:Developments over the
Last Five Years 2002-2007, 8 BNA Class Action Litig Rep 787 (Oct 26, 2007) ("[Fjor better or
worse, it is today clear that the tide has turned against class certification, and new barriers have
arisen across a variety of contexts where formerly class certification had seemed automatic.").
14 131 S Ct 1740 (2011).
15 Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the
Modern Class Action, 104 Mich L Rev 373, 425-27 (2005).
16 In January 2012, a private equity fund called the Carlyle Group sought to include a
class action waiver in its charter in advance of an initial public offering in order to immunize it
from future securities class actions. See Carlyle Group LP, Amendment No 2 to Form S-i
RegistrationStatement under The Securities Act of 1933 (Securities and Exchange Commission Jan
10, 2012), online at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1527166/000095012312000638
/w83442a2svlza.htm#204 (visited May 2, 2012). The fund ultimately withdrew the
"controversial" waiver under "pressure from investors and regulators," but future efforts to
embed class action waivers in IPO registration materials may become more commonplace and
less controversial. Kevin Roose, Carlyle Drops Arbitration Clause from LP.O. Plans, NY
Times DealBook (Feb 3, 2012), online at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/03/carlyledrops-arbitration-clause-from-i-p-o-plans/ (visited May 2, 2012). See also John C. Coffee Jr,
The Death of Stockholder Litigation?,Natl L J (Feb 13,2012), online at http://www.law.com/jsp
/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202541959250&Thedeath of stockholderlitigation&slreturn=1
(visited May 2, 2012) (suggesting that other companies are considering adding class action
waivers, and "a horde of managements [will] follow the first company to succeed in including
such a provision").
17 Chris Bourgeacq, a labor and employment attorney for AT&T Services, Inc, advanced
this argument shortly after Concepcion was decided:

[In a]ffirming the broad preemptive scope of the FAA, the Court's decision will no doubt
reach beyond just consumer disputes.... With courts approving arbitration of virtually
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So where does this leave civil law enforcement in the United
States?
One critically important dimension to this question is the proper
scope of the Concepcion decision itself. In other words, under what

circumstances will the imposition of class action waivers in form
agreements be rejected as unenforceable? What Concepcion tells us
beyond doubt is that a broad state law rule holding unenforceable

class action waivers in consumer adhesion contracts is itself
preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act18 (FAA). But Concepcion
tells us little about what happens when a claimant can prove as a
factual matter that an arbitration clause containing a class action
waiver precludes her from being able to vindicate rights that she
would otherwise be able to vindicate. Here, a too-broad reading of
Concepcion may collide with Supreme Court jurisprudence that
provides agreements to arbitrate federal statutory claims are fully

enforceable, but only "so long as the prospective litigant effectively
may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral
forum."19 And as we discuss, a similar precept may apply in many
state law cases.
A closely related question is whether any state or federal
legislation is likely to restore the pre-Concepcion status quo. A
federal bill that would bar the use of arbitration clauses in most
consumer contracts was introduced immediately after Concepcion

any employment-related dispute, employers should immediately revisit their arbitration
policies and agreements to determine whether they wish to carve out arbitration of
consolidated and class claims. Doing so could possibly insulate an employer against a
class action in any forum.
FAA Bars States from Restricting Class-Action Waivers in Arbitration Agreements, CCH
Employment Law Daily (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business Apr 28, 2011), online at
http://www.employmentlawdaily.com/index.php/news/faa-bars-states-from-restricting-classaction-waivers-in-arbitration-agreements/ (visited Jan 7, 2012). But see Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission Compliance Manual, Notice 915.002 (July 10, 1997), reprinted in
Employment Practices Guide at 6169-77 (CCH 2009) (taking the position that an employee
cannot waive the right to file an administrative complaint, nor can agencies be required to
waive their right to exercise statutory rights in bringing enforcement actions). See also D.R.
Horton, Inc, and Michael Cuda, 2012 WL 36274, *17 (NLRB 2012) (striking down arbitration
agreements imposed on employees as a condition of employment that prohibit both class
actions in court and class-wide arbitration as a violation of Section 7 of the National Labor
relations Act).
18 Pub L No 68-401, 43 Stat 883, codified as amended at 9 USC § 1 et seq.
19 Green Tree Financial Corp-Alabama v Randolph, 531 US 79, 90-91 (2000), quoting
Gilmer v Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp, 500 US 20, 28 (1991), quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp
v Soler Chrysler-Plymoutk Inc, 473 US 614, 637 (1985) (stating that high arbitration costs
might render an arbitration agreement unenforceable).
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was decided.' But similar bills have died in committee before, and

the prospects for this one appear no brighter.'

In many states,

meanwhile, legislation is surely feasible, but effectiveness is another
matter. In our view, blunt attempts by states to evade Concepcion

(for example, by making class action rights unwaivable in consumer
contracts) are doomed, while more nuanced legislation mandating
case-by-case analysis appears legally and politically viable.
A more sweeping solution (or threat, depending on one's
perspective) to Concepcion is posed by the new Consumer Finance
Protection Bureau (CFPB), which is charged with studying the
effects of arbitration clauses in consumer financial contracts and
then, if warranted, enacting regulations that would restrict or even
prohibit the use of such clauses.' If exercised-and if upheld against
inevitable legal challenge-CFPB regulations would undercut the

use of class waivers by much of the financial services industry.
Similar power provided to the SEC may likewise undercut the ability
of funds and brokerages to employ class waivers.
So to recap: some federal statutory claims, and arguably some
state claims, will likely withstand Concepcion by relying on factual

case-by-case showings; state legislatures have some room to enact
nuanced statutes that will allow some state cases to survive
Concepcion; and there is some possibility that the new CFPB -if it is

not stillborn at the hands of hostile congressional midwives-will
eliminate some class action waivers in the financial services field.

Collectively, that is not nothing. But most class cases will not survive
the impending tsunami of class action waivers. And as this great
20
After Concepcion was decided, Senators Al Franken and Richard Blumenthal, along
with Congressman Hank Johnson, reintroduced the Arbitration Fairness Act, which would
prohibit class waivers in all consumer, employment, and civil-rights-related contracts. See
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, S 987, 112th Cong, 1st Sess, in 157 Cong Rec S 2929 (May 12,
2011).
21 Similar bills seeking to amend the FAA to provide that "[n]o predispute arbitration
agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of-(1) an employment,
consumer, or franchise dispute; or (2) a dispute arising under any statute intended to protect
civil rights or to regulate contracts or transactions between parties of unequal bargaining
power" were introduced in 2007 and 2009. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, HR 1020 § 4,
111th Cong, 1st Sess, 155 Cong Rec H 1517 (daily ed Feb 12, 2009) (invalidating agreements
requiring arbitration of employment, consumer and civil rights disputes); Arbitration Fairness
Act of 2007, S 1782 § 4, 110th Cong, 1st Sess, 153 Cong Rec S 9144 (daily ed July 12, 2007)
(same); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, HR 3010 § 4, 110th Cong, 1st Sess, 153 Cong Rec H 7774
(daily ed July 12, 2007) (same). See also Editorial, Gutting Class Action, NY Times A26 (May
13, 2011) (noting that the chances of federal legislation overriding Concepcion "aren't great in
the current political environment").
22 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank
Act) § 1028, Pub L No 111-203, 124 Stat 1376, 2003-04 (2010), codified in relevant part at
12 USC § 5518.
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mass of consumer protection, antitrust, employment, and other cases
is swept out to sea, the question arises: What or who can fill the
resulting enforcement gap?
And here, we believe the American tradition of private
involvement in the enforcement of public law will supply the answer.
Just as the posse gave way to the Pinkertons, we expect that the
dominant contemporary modality of private participation in civil law
enforcement-the modem class action-will give way to something
else.
In our view, the "private attorney general" role assumed by class
action lawyers over the past several decades should give way to a
world in which state attorneys general make broad use of their
parens patriae authority-far greater use than they have in the
past-to represent the interests of their citizens in the very
consumer, antitrust, wage-and-hour, and other cases that have long
provided the staple of class action practice.
And to tackle complex cases, we would hope to see
underfunded AG offices making use of the lawyers who have
acquired expertise in originating, investigating, and prosecuting class
actions, as well as financing them. To be sure, AGs will come under
fire in some quarters for leveraging the private bar to generate,
prosecute, and finance cases; for blurring the lines between class
actions and parens patriae. But the critique lacks substance. As much
as parens patriae actions in a post-Concepcion world may come to
resemble class actions, critics should be significantly mollified by the
monitoring function that AGs may bring to bear. It is the lack of
effective

monitoring-the

"agency"

problem-that

underlies

virtually all of the criticisms of class practice. The active presence of
a responsible elected official here, as both cocounsel and client,
vanquishes the agency critique in our view.
Deployed correctly, the model makes for good policy and good
politics. Without AG involvement, consumers and employees injured
by an illegal practice will often have no recourse in a postConcepcion world. So there is a compelling rationale for action.
Meanwhile, by leveraging the private bar, the state AGs can recoup
vast amounts of money for their citizens and reap commensurate
political credit.
Of course, there are stiff challenges here. The corporate
interests that decimated class actions, and the academics and
politicians sympathetic to their positions, will be geared up to launch
very similar attacks on parens patriae cases. And while current
doctrine is largely inhospitable to the expected legal attacks, as we
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show, the political attacks may prove more formidable. Fee
arrangements with private counsel present especially rich political
targets, making it imperative to institute transparent contracting
processes and, probably, some measure of fee caps. Watchful
supervisory control over the litigation will be critical. And AGs will
have to be vigilant in their fundraising activities to avoid any element
of "pay to play" in the donations they accept from law firms or
groups of lawyers. Meanwhile, the corporate lobby is free to pool
unlimited donations to oppose activist AGs, particularly in the wake
of Citizens United v FederalElection Commission.'
Still, as the class waivers embraced by the Concepcion Court
drive significant litigation opportunities into AGs offices around the
country, we think the stakes are sufficiently high that all of these
challenges are likely to be managed. We begin, then, with
Concepcion.
I. THE ROAD TO A T& T MOBILITY V CONCEPCION

Six years ago, we predicted that class action waivers embedded
in arbitration provisions, if not constrained by legal challenges,
would threaten the viability of most forms of aggregate litigation.'
We pointed out that the waiver is capable of reaching all class
actions based on any sort of contractual relationship between the
plaintiffs and the defendant-a condition that is satisfied in all
federal antitrust class actions, where plaintiffs must be "direct
purchasers,"' the vast majority of consumer cases, employment and
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 197426 (ERISA) cases,
and indeed just about all class actions other than "fraud on the
market" securities fraud actions.27 We reasoned that, absent broad
legal invalidation, it is inevitable that the waiver will find its way
from the agreements of "early adopter" credit card, telecom, and ecommerce companies into virtually all contracts that could even
remotely form the predicate of a class action someday. After all, the
incremental burden of including magic words in dispute resolution
boilerplate - or even on point-of-sale purchase receipts or boxstuffer notices-is surely minimal in relation to the benefit of
removing oneself from potential exposure to aggregate litigation.
Ultimately, if legal challenges to the waiver are sufficiently
23
24

25
26

27

130 S Ct 876, 913 (2010).
See Gilles, 104 Mich L Rev at 425-27 (cited in note 15).
See Illinois Brick Co v Illinois, 431 US 720,729 (1977).
Pub L No 93-406, 88 Stat 829, codified at 29 USC § 1001 et seq.
See Gilles, 104 Mich L Rev at 413-25 (cited in note 15).
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vanquished, we concluded that transactional attorneys will someday
face malpractice liability for not including the waiver in contracts -as
a sort of standard vaccine, like a rabies shot.
All of these dire predictions, of course, were contingent on the
failure of legal challenges to the class action waiver. And in 2005, we
focused on two principal legal challenges to the waiver-one that
had begun to play out in the case law at the time, and a second that
we developed and that some courts have embraced in the
intervening years.
A. First-Wave Challenges: State Law Unconscionability
The "first wave" challenge to class action waivers was grounded
in state unconscionability law-that the inclusion of class action
waivers in standard adhesion contracts renders the agreements so
one-sided as to satisfy the common law contract doctrine prohibiting
"unconscionable" agreements.' Under the FAA's saving clause, a
party may oppose arbitration on such "grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract," and fifteen years ago, the
Supreme Court observed that state-law unconscionability provides
one such ground. 9
As of 2005, a handful of courts, principally in California, had
blown the dust off their largely dormant unconscionability
Most
jurisprudence and invalidated class action waivers.'
prominently, the California Supreme Court in Discover Bank v
Superior Court3 focused on the "important role of class action
remedies in California law" as "the only effective way to halt and
redress [consumer] exploitation," and held that class action waivers
in consumer adhesion contracts are unconscionable because they
"may operate effectively as exculpatory clauses that are contrary to
public policy."32

2
See id at 399-404 (discussing first-wave challenges to class action waivers and noting
that "[blasic contract law directs that a contractual provision be deemed unenforceable and
unconscionable if it is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable: 'the former
focusing on "oppression" or "surprise" due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on "overly
harsh" or "one-sided" results"'), quoting Discover Bank v Superior Court, 113 P3d 1100, 1108
(Cal 2005).
29
See Doctor's Associates, Inc v Casarotno, 517 US 681, 687 (1996) (holding that
"generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be
applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening § 2" of the FAA).
30 See Gilles, 104 Mich L Rev at 401-02 & nn 140-50 (cited in note 15).
31 113 P3d 1100 (Cal 2005).
32
Idat 1106,1108.
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Discover Bank ushered in a flood of state court decisions
invalidating class action waivers on grounds of unconscionability.3" In
state appellate courts around the country, public interest law firms
such as Public Justice (in efforts led by the tireless Paul Bland) and
Public Citizen lent their expertise to plaintiffs and won a surprising

string of victories.' Whereas at the time of our 2005 article, most
courts to address the issue had rejected the unconscionability

argument and only California had fully embraced it,3 by 2011 at least
fourteen states had ruled class action waivers unenforceable on these
broad public policy grounds. By the time of the Concepcion decision,
the trend was unmistakable: class action waivers were being defeated

in courts around the country.
B.

Second-Wave Challenges: Vindication of Federal
Statutory Rights
The "second wave" challenge to class waivers asserts that the

waiver's implicit prohibition against spreading the costs of litigation
across multiple claimants in collective litigation precludes the
individual plaintiff from being able to vindicate her federal statutory

rights. Unlike the unconscionability challenge,' this argument takes

33 State and federal courts finding class action waivers unconscionable under state law:
Cooper v QC FinancialServices, Inc, 503 F Supp 2d 1266, 1290 (D Ariz 2007) (Arizona law);
Shroyer v New CingularWireless Services, Inc, 498 F3d 976,985 (9th Cir 2007) (California law);
Caban v J.P. Morgan Chase & Co,606 F Supp 2d 1361, 1372 (SD Fla 2009) (Delaware law);
Dale v Comcast Corp, 498 F3d 1216, 1224 (11th Cir 2007) (Georgia law); Kinkel v Cingular
2006); Schnuerle v Insight Communications Company,
Wireless LLC, 857 NE2d 250, 274 (I11
LP, 2010 WL 5129850, *7 (Ky); Skirchak v Dynamics Research Corp, 508 F3d 49, 59-60
(1st Cir 2007) (Massachusetts law); Ruhl v Lee's Summit Honda, 322 SW3d 136, 139-40 (Mo
2010); Fiser v Dell Computer Corporation, 188 P3d 1215, 1221 (NM 2008); Muhammad v
County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Delaware, 912 A2d 88, 100-01 (NJ 2006); Tillman v
Commercial Credit Loans, Inc, 655 SE2d 362, 373 (NC 2008); Schwartz v Alltel Corporation,
2006 WL 2243649, *6-7 (Ohio App); Vasquez-Lopez v Beneficial Oregon, Inc, 152 P3d 940,
953 (Or Ct App 2007); Thibodeau v Comcast Corporation,912 A2d 874, 887 (Pa Super Ct
2006); Herron v Century BMW, 693 SE2d 394, 400 (SC 2010); Scott v Cingular Wireless, 161
P3d 1000, 1009 (Wash 2007); Al-Safin v Circuit City Stores, Inc, 394 F3d 1254, 1261-62 (9th Cir
2005) (Washington law); Wisconsin Auto Title Loans, Inc v Jones, 714 NW2d 155, 176 (2006)
(Wisconsin law).
34 See, for example, Felts v CLK Management, Inc, 254 P3d 124, 137-39 (NM App 2011);
McKee v AT&T Corp, 191 P3d 845, 397-98 (Wash 2008); Emma Cheuse, Alan Morrison
Supreme CourtAssistance Project Cert. Petitions of Public Interest; April 20, 2007 Conference 28
(Public Citizen Litigation Group Apr 20, 2007), online at http://www.citizen.org/documents
/scapwatch2007O420.pdf (visited Jan 2, 2011).
35 Gilles, 104 Mich L Rev at 400 n 139 (cited in note 15) (listing decisions that upheld
class action waivers against the unconscionabifity challenge).
36 In re American Express Merchants' Litigation (Amex 1), 554 F3d 300, 320 (2d Cir 2009)
("We do not follow these cases because they all rely on findings of unconscionability under

The University of Chicago Law Review

[79:623

as its starting point the Supreme Court's recognition in Mitsubishi
Motors Corp v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc" that federal statutory
claims are fully arbitrable, but only "so long as the prospective
litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the
arbitral forum."'8 Applying this precept, the Supreme Court in Green
Tree Financial Corp-Alabama v Randolph" recognized that "the

existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant... from
effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral
forum,"' and it established a test: "[W]here... a party seeks to
invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitration
would be prohibitively expensive, that party bears the burden of
showing the likelihood of incurring such costs.""
Writing in 2005, we observed that plaintiffs in In re American
Express Merchants' Litigation' (Amex) were using this MitsubishiRandolph line of reasoning to fashion a "second wave" attack on
class waivers.' The plaintiffs in Amex, a complex antitrust case,
submitted undisputed evidence that the cost of establishing liability
would exceed several hundred thousand dollars-most of it expert
economists' fees, which are not recoverable under the Clayton Act's"
state law, while we have relied here on a vindication of statutory rights analysis, which is part
of the federal substantive law of arbitrability.").
37 473 US 614 (1985).
38
Id at 637-38. See also Morrison v Circuit City Stores, Inc, 317 F3d 646, 658 (6th Cir
2003) (en banc) ("The Supreme Court has made clear that statutory rights ... may be subject
to mandatory arbitration only if the arbitral forum permits the effective vindication of those
rights.") (emphasis added); Bradford v Rockwell Semiconductor Systems, Inc, 238 F3d 549, 556
(4th Cir 2001):
[T]he appropriate inquiry is one that evaluates whether the arbitral forum in a particular
case is an adequate and accessible substitute to litigation, i.e., a case-by-case analysis that
focuses, among other things, upon the claimant's ability to pay the arbitration fees and
costs, the expected cost differential between arbitration and litigation in court, and
whether that cost differential is so substantial as to deter the bringing of claims.
531 US 79 (2000).
Id at 90. See also Booker v Robert Half International, Inc, 413 F3d 77, 81 (DC Cir
2005) (construing Randolph to allow a party to "resist[ ] arbitration on the ground that the
terms of the arbitration agreement interfere with the effective vindication of statutory rights,"
but that party "bears the burden of showing the likelihood of such interference," which
"cannot be carried by 'mere speculation"').
41 Randolph, 531 US at 92. See also Gilles, 104 Mich L Rev at 407 n 175 (cited in note 15)
(listing cases following Randolph holding that statutory claims may be subjected to arbitration
so long as the agreement at issue does not force plaintiffs to assume financial burdens so
prohibitive as to "deter the bringing of claims").
42
2006 WL 662341, revd 554 F3d 300 (2d Cir 2009), cert granted, judgment vacated,
130 S Ct 2401 (2010), affd on remand, 634 F3d 187 (2d Cir 2011) (Amex II), affd, 667 F3d 204
(2d Cir 2012).
43 See Gilles, 104 Mich L Rev at 407-08.
44 Pub L No 63-212, 38 Stat 730 (1914), codified as amended at 15 USC §§ 12-27 and
29 USC §§ 52-53.
39

40
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fee shifting provisions, or under the rules of any arbitral body -while
the median named plaintiff sought damages of roughly $5,200.'
Under the arbitration clause at issue in that case, with its class action
waiver, plaintiffs thus argued that they could not "effectively
vindicate [their] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum." As
we wrote in the 2005 article:
The simple logic of this second-wave argument is that the
collective action waiver-and particularly its implicit ban on
spreading across multiple plaintiffs the costs of experts,
depositions, neutrals' fees, and other disbursements-forces the
individual claimant to assume financial burdens so prohibitive as
to deter the bringing of claims. In the absence of the waiver, the
claimant may spread these costs across thousands of coventurers
(or have them advanced by lawyers, as happens in practice). In
the presence of the waiver, these costs fall on her alone. And
these costs, in a complex commercial case, will exceed the value
of the recovery she is seeking.'
At the district court level, the Amex plaintiffs lost, as the court
granted defendant's motion to compel one-on-one arbitration." But
then, in 2006, the First Circuit decided Kristian v Comcast,' in which
it endorsed the "second wave" argument, quoting the above excerpt
to invalidate Comcast's class action waiver provisions. 9 Specifically,
the Kristian court found that the "sheer complexity" of an antitrust
case required an intensive factual analysis and prohibitively
expensive expert testimony. Because of the costs and legal intricacy
involved, the court concluded that plaintiffs could not enforce their
rights except on a class-wide basis.'
Then, in January 2009, the Second Circuit reversed the district
court in Amex L" In a decision authored by Judge Rosemary Pooler,
the court held that Randolph was controlling and that plaintiffs had
amply established that "arbitration would be prohibitively

45
Amex 1, 554 F3d at 316-17 (describing expert report of economist Dr. Gary French,
who concluded that "it would not be worthwhile for an individual plaintiff... to pursue
individual arbitration or litigation where the out-of-pocket costs, just for the expert economic
study and services, would be at least several hundred thousand dollars, and might exceed
$1 million").
46 Gilles, 104 Mich L Rev at 407 (cited in note 15).
47 2006 WL 662341, *10 (SDNY).
48 446 F3d 25 (1st Cir 2006).
49 Id at 55.
50 See id at 59-61.
51 554 F3d 300,319-20 (2d Cir 2009) (Amex 1).
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expensive" ' so that "enforcement of the class action bar in the Card
Acceptance Agreement 'flatly ensures that no small merchant may
challenge American Express's tying arrangements under the federal
antitrust laws."'
Secondarily, the court held that the class action waiver operates
as a prospective waiver of liability, void as against clear public policy
insofar as it "grant[s] Amex de facto immunity from antitrust liability
by removing the plaintiffs' only reasonably feasible means of
recovery.'

After Amex I was decided, the Supreme Court decided StoltNielsen SA v AnimalFeeds InternationalCorp," holding that where

an arbitration clause is silent on the availability of class arbitration,
the agreement cannot be construed to provide for aggregate
procedures.' The Court then granted certiorari in Amex I, vacating
the judgment and remanding the case to the Second Circuit "for
further consideration in light" of the Stolt-Nielsen decision." On
remand, the Second Circuit in March 2011 reaffirmed its decision,
reiterating in In re American Express Merchants' Litigation8 (Amex I1)
that "the record evidence before us establishes, as a matter of law,

that the cost of plaintiffs' individually arbitrating their dispute with
Amex would be prohibitive, effectively depriving plaintiffs of the

statutory protections of the antitrust laws." 9
C.

The Concepcion Decision

In April 2011, a 5-4 Court decided AT&T Mobility v
Concepcion, reconfiguring in one stroke the law of class action
waivers and the landscape of aggregate litigation practice in the
United States.
Id at 315, quoting Randolph, 531 US at 92.
Amex I, 554 F3d at 319, quoting Brief and Special Appendix for Plaintiffs-Appellants,
In re American Express Merchants' Litigation, No 06-1871, *17 (filed Sept 11, 2006) (available
on Westlaw at 2006 WL 6198567).
54 Amex 1, 554 F3d at 320 (observing that the "public interest in vigilant enforcement of
the antitrust laws through the instrumentality of the private treble-damage action" could not
be squared with an agreement that conferred de facto immunity from civil liability to
American Express), quoting Lawlor v National Screen Service Corp, 349 US 322,329 (1955).
55 130 S Ct 1758 (2010)..
56
See id at 1775, 1782 (finding "a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit
to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreedto do
so" because "arbitration 'is a matter of consent, not coercion'), quoting Volt Information
Sciences, Inc v Board of Trustees of Leland StanfordJunior University, 489 US 468, 479 (1989).
57
American Express Co v Italian Colors Restaurant, 130 S Ct 2401, 2401 (2010)
(memorandum opinion).
58
634F3d 187 (2d Cir2011).
52
53

59

Id at 197-98.
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The facts are germane: In 2002, Vincent and Liza Concepcion
responded to an advertisement for a "free" AT&T cell phone with
the purchase of a two-year service contract. After learning that that
they had to pay $30.22 in sales tax for the putatively free device, the
Concepcions initiated a class action lawsuit. AT&T then moved to
compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause in its standard
service agreement, which contained a class action waiver.' Notably,
that clause further provided that AT&T will pay claimants a
minimum of $7,500 and twice their attorney's fees if they obtain an
arbitration award that exceeds AT&T's final settlement offer."
Stating that it was constrained to follow Discover Bank, the
district court invalidated the class action waiver and directed classwide arbitration.' But the court expressly observed that the
arbitration procedures mandated by the contract were quite
hospitable to small claimants,' and that "the $7,500 premium
functioned as 'a substantial inducement for the consumer to pursue
the claim in arbitration' if a dispute was not resolved informally. '
The Ninth Circuit affirmed."
The Supreme Court then granted certiorari and, in a decision
authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, "consider[ed] whether the FAA
60 Concepcion, 131 S Ct at 1744. The Court also explained that "[tihe contract provided
for arbitration of all disputes between the parties, but required that claims be brought in the
parties' 'individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class or
representative proceeding."' The contract further provided that "the arbitrator may not
consolidate more than one person's claims, and may not otherwise preside over any form of a
representative or class proceeding." Id at 1744 & n 2.
61 Id at 1744 (detailing the terms of the service agreement).
62
Laster v T-Mobile USA, Inc, 2008 WL 5216255, *14 (SD Cal).
63 Id at *10-11. The Court in Concepcion, considering the same contract, also noted
several other elements of the agreement that it perceived to be in the interests of small
claimants:

[T]he agreement specifies that AT&T must pay all costs for nonfrivolous claims; that
arbitration must take place in the county in which the customer is billed; that, for claims
of $10,000 or less, the customer may choose whether the arbitration proceeds in person,
by telephone, or based only on submissions; that either party may bring a claim in small
claims court in lieu of arbitration; and that the arbitrator may award any form of
individual relief, including injunctions and presumably punitive damages.
Concepcion, 131 S Ct at 1744.
64 Concepcion, 131 S Ct at 1745, quoting Laster,2008 WL 5216255 at *11.
65 Laster v AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F3d 849, 855-57 (9th Cir 2009) (asserting that the
Discover Bank ruling was a "refinement of the unconscionability analysis applicable to
contracts generally in California," and therefore did not discriminate against arbitration),
quoting Shroyer, 498 F3d at 987 (finding that California contract law applies to arbitration,
including the general contract defense of unconscionability). See also Cal Civil Code
§ 1670.5(a) (providing that courts may refuse to enforce any contract found "to have been
unconscionable at the time it was made," or may "limit the application of any unconscionable
clause"); Cal Civil Code § 1668 (exculpatory clause).
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prohibits States from conditioning the enforceability of certain
arbitration agreements on the availability of classwide arbitration
procedures." ' In arguing against preemption, plaintiffs relied on the
FAA's saving clause, which provides that arbitration agreements
shall be enforced as written "save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract,"'67 and argued that
California's rule holding class action waivers unconscionable applies
equally to contracts mandating arbitration or those banning class
actions in court.'
The majority-with the notable exception of Justice Clarence
Thomas'-did not dispute that the Discover Bank rule is a
"ground[ ] ...for the revocation of any contract" under California

law, and so is nominally within the coverage of the saving clause."0
However, Justice Scalia wrote, "[a]lthough § 2's saving clause
preserves generally applicable contract defenses, nothing in it
suggests an intent to preserve state-law rules that stand as an
obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA's objectives."" And the
Discover Bank rule "stand[s] as an obstacle," the Court held,
because it categorically allows claimants in any consumer case to
demand class-wide arbitration, which the majority views as utterly
antithetical to arbitration. Thus, in Justice Scalia's view, "California's
Discover Bank rule [ ] interferes with arbitration. Although the rule
does not require classwide arbitration, 2 it allows any party to a
consumer contract to demand it ex post."'
Notably, the Discover Bank rule did not require any showing by
plaintiffs that class procedures were necessary to effectively
66 Concepcion, 131 S Ct at 1744 (outlining the fact pattern presented by the case,
including the underlying claim and AT&T's motion to compel arbitration).
67 9 USC § 2.
68 See Concepcion, 131 S Ct at 1745-47.
69 Justice Thomas is of the view that the only viable defenses under FAA § 2 are
defenses to the formation of a contract-for example, duress or fraudulent inducement-and
that other public-policy-based challenges may well provide legal grounds to challenge the
validity of any contract, but they do not count as "grounds ...for the revocation" of contracts
within the meaning of FAA § 2. No other justice shares this view. See Concepcion, 131 S Ct
at 1753-57 (Thomas concurring).
70 See id at 1746 (majority).
71 Id at 1748 (explaining that a savings clause in a statute cannot be interpreted to give a
common law right that would contradict the overall purpose of the statute). This is one of a
number of recent and controversial preemption decisions by the Supreme Court. See, for
example, Bruesewitz v Wyeth LLC, 131 S Ct 1068, 1082 (2011) (finding preemption under the
Vaccine Act); Chamber of Commerce of the United States v Whiting, 31 S Ct 1968, 1981 (2011)
(finding no preemption under the Immigration Reform and Control Act); Williamson v Mazda
Motor of America, Inc, 131 S Ct 1131, 1137 (2011) (finding no preemption under federal motor
vehicle safety standards).
72
Concepcion, 131 S Ct at 1750.
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rights. Instead, the Discover Bank rule was

classificatory- that is, it operated categorically, classifying class
action waivers in consumer contracts as unconscionable. While the
rule was nominally "limited to adhesion contracts" and applicable
only to claims that seek "predictably small damages" and "allege a
scheme to cheat consumers," the Court deemed these putative
limitations illusory, observing that all consumer contracts nowadays
are "adhesive," that the small damages factor is "toothless and
malleable," and that a requirement of a mere "allegation" of a
' To Justice Scalia and brethren,
scheme "has no limiting effect."73
then, the Discover Bank rule fatally "interfere[d] with fundamental

attributes of arbitration and thus create[d] a scheme inconsistent
with the FAA."7
II. WHAT'S LEFT OF CLASS ACTION PRACTICE AFTER CONCEPCION

At the outset, it is clear there are many cases that class action
waivers simply cannot reach.75 In some, the nature of the underlying
transaction does not allow for the effective communication of the
waiver because there is no contractual relationship between the

parties-for example, securities fraud cases based on secondary
market purchases," many civil rights and environmental cases, and
many consumer cases stemming from retail purchases. In other cases,
Congress has evinced a clear intent that the class action remedy be
available. And then there are outlier cases: for example, under the
73
Id (noting that class-wide arbitration inevitably has different procedures and
requirements than normal bilateral arbitration and undermines some of the basic reasons to
arbitrate, such as confidentiality).
74 Id at 1748-49 (noting specifically that the benefits of arbitration, such as efficiency,
stream-lining dispute resolution, confidentiality and lowered costs, are undermined with the
Discovery Bank rule).
75 See Leslie Bailey and Paul Bland, How Courts Can and Should Limit AT&T Mobility
v. Concepcion (Public Justice 2011), online at http://www.publicjustice.net/Resources/HowCourts-Can-and-Should-Liniit-ATT-v-Concepcion.aspx (visited Jan 8, 2012) (collecting
arguments for minimizing the impact of Concepcion on class action waivers such as cases
where the arbitration clause expressly adopts state law, or where a prohibition on waivers
would not conflict with federal law).
76
But see note 16.
77 As the Supreme Court made clear in Gilmer v Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp, 500 US 20
(1991), arbitration agreements are unenforceable in the rare case where Congress has clearly
evinced an intention that the statutory claim at issue is inarbitrable. See id at 26. We are aware
of a handful of federal statutes that appear to fit this bill: 15 USC § 1639c(e)(1) (barring
arbitration clauses in residential mortgage loans); 18 USC § 1514A(e) (forbidding predispute
contracts requiring arbitration of whistleblower claims under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act not
enforceable); 10 USC § 987(e)(3), (0(4) (voiding arbitration clauses in payday loan or any
consumer credit contracts-with the exception of residential mortgages and car loans-with
members of the military or their families); 15 USC § 1226(a)(2) (prohibiting automobile

The University of ChicagoLaw Review

[79:623

"reverse preemption" doctrine unique to the McCarran-Ferguson
Act,7 Concepcion will not affect state laws-and there are about
twenty of them -that bar insurance companies from using mandatory
arbitration clauses.' Likewise, several major credit-card-issuing
banks are enjoined from including mandatory arbitration clauses in
their cardholder agreements until late 2013."
But beyond these exceptional cases, one must ask: Under what
circumstances, going forward, will courts decline to enforce class
action waivers? What sorts of rules governing the enforceability of
these waivers will pass muster?
A. Cases Where the Waiver Precludes Vindication of Federal
Statutory Rights
The first question here is whether the federal vindication-ofrights doctrine that finds its fullest expression in the Amex cases
survives Concepcion. In the most recent installment of what is now
the Amex trilogy, the Second Circuit made clear that its conception
of the vindication-of-rights doctrine is unaffected by Concepcion.' In
our view,' the court is correct, for two independent reasons.
manufacturers from imposing predispute arbitration clauses in their franchise agreements with
dealers).
78 Pub L No 79-15, 59 Stat 33 (1945), codified as amended at 15 USC §§ 1011-15.
79 See State Laws Regulating Arbitration in Insurance Contracts (Public Citizen 2010),
online at http://www.citizen.org/congress/article-redirect.cfmn?ID=6560 (visited Jan 4, 2011).
80 See 15 USC § 1012(b) ("No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair,
or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates
to the business of insurance."). The Act allows state laws enacted "for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance" to reverse the preemption of congressional acts that do
not specifically "relate[] to the business of insurance." This reflects a policy decision that it is in
the public interest for states to have a broad grant of authority over the business of insurance.

15 USC § 1012(b).
81
See Final Judgment and Order of Dismissal, In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust
Litigation, No 05-cv-7116 (SDNY July 22, 2010) (approving settlement that required
defendants Bank of America, Capital One, Chase, and HSBC (1) to remove any arbitration
clauses and class action bans from US cardholder contracts; (2) not to restore or otherwise
insert any arbitration clause or class action ban into its US cardholder contracts within three
and one half years following May 1, 2010; and (3) not to seek to enforce their current or former
arbitration clauses or class action bans against any members of the settlement class). See also
http://arbitration.ccfsettlement.com/ (visited Jan 8, 2012).
82 Subsequent to the decision in Concepcion, the Second Circuit ordered the Amex
parties to brief the question of what effect, if any, the Supreme Court's decision should have on
the rulings in Amex I and Amex ff. On February 1, 2012, the Second Circuit in Amex III
broadly reaffirmed its prior two decisions. See generally In re American Express Merchants'
Litigation, 634 F3d 187 (2d Cir 2011) (Amex III). As of this writing, American Express's
application for rehearing en banc is pending and a petition for certiorari will surely follow.
83 Full disclosure: the authors are hardly unbiased. Mr. Friedman is lead counsel for the
plaintiffs in the Amex litigation.
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1. Preemption analysis versus federal harmonizing principle.
First, the sole basis for the Supreme Court's decision in
Concepcion was preemption. Once the Court determined that
California's Discover Bank rule stood as an "obstacle to
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress," as expressed in the FAA, the Supremacy Clause kicked
in and dictated that the FAA preempts the state law rule.' By
contrast, where the enforcement of an arbitration agreement under
the FAA would prevent vindication of a federal statutory right, no
such preemption doctrine governs.' Instead, the governing principle
is supplied by the "federal substantive law of arbitration, ' under
which federal courts harmonize the FAA and federal statutes (such
as the Clayton Act) by applying the "vindication of statutory rights
analysis" of Randolph and related case law.'
Under this federal harmonizing analysis, an agreement to
arbitrate a federal statutory claim must be enforced as written, unless
and until enforcement of the arbitration provision would preclude
the claimant from vindicating its federal statutory rights. In a case
where "a party seeks to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the
ground that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive," Randolph
harmonizes the FAA with substantive federal remedial statutes by
mandating that "that party bear[] the burden of showing the
likelihood of incurring such costs""- that is, that it would incur costs
so steep as to preclude vindication of the federal right.
Concepcion, 131 S Ct at 1753.
See, for example, Tufariello v Long IslandRail Road Co, 458 F3d 80, 86 (2d Cir 2006)
("[T]he preemption doctrine flows from the Constitution's Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. Art.
VI, cl. 2, which 'invalidates state laws that interfere with, or are contrary to federal law'... The
doctrine is inapplicable to a potential conflict between two federal statutes."); Madeira v
Affordable Housing Foundation,Inc, 469 F3d 219, 237 (2d Cir 2006) (pointing to "an important
legal distinction between" preemption analysis, on the one hand, and cases where courts seek
"to reconcile two federal statutes to ensure that one did not trench on the other, a task
routinely performed by federal courts"); Trollinger v Tyson Foods, Inc, 370 F3d 602, 608
(6th Cir 2004) ("[P]reemption does not describe the effect of one federal law upon another; it
refers to the supremacy of federal law over state law when Congress, acting within its
enumerated powers, intends one to displace the other.").
86 Amex H, 634 F3d at 194, quoting Kristian, 446 F3d at 63.
87
See Randolph, 531 US at 92. See also National Association of Home Builders v
Defenders of Wildlife, 551 US 644, 678-79 (2007) (Stevens dissenting) (arguing that courts
"should first try to harmonize" federal statutes, and observing "no statute must yield [to
another federal statute] unless it is truly incapable of coexistence").
88 Randolph, 531 US at 90-92:
84
85

It may well be that the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant such as
Randolph from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum.
But the record does not show that Randolph will bear such costs if she goes to

The University of Chicago Law Review

[79:623

2. Categorical rule versus case-by-case test.
Second, the argument underlying the Amex cases was based
upon a detailed factual showing that, if the arbitration agreement
were enforced as written with its class action waiver, plaintiffs would
be unable to vindicate their rights in a complex and expensive
antitrust case.' The Discover Bank rule at issue in Concepcion, by

contrast, did not require a claimant to prove that she was precluded
from vindicating her rights under a particular arbitration clause in a
particular case.' And, in fact, the Court suggested the Concepcions
could have vindicated their rights under the particular arbitration

clause at issue in Concepcion."
It would be quite a stretch to argue that Concepcion cuts off a
claimant's ability to avoid an arbitration clause by making the sort of
case-by-case showing prescribed in Randolph.' And indeed, the
Concepcion Court expressly granted certiorari to consider whether
states may condition the enforceability of an arbitration agreement
on the availability of class-wide procedures "when those procedures
are not necessary to ensure that the parties to the arbitration
agreement are able to vindicate their claims."93 Still, there is certainly
arbitration.... The "risk" that Randolph will be saddled with prohibitive costs is too
speculative to justify the invalidation of an arbitration agreement.
See also In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litigation, 505 F3d 274, 285 (4th Cir 2007) ("[I]f a party
could demonstrate that the prohibition on class actions likely would make arbitration
prohibitively expensive, such a showing could invalidate an agreement.").
89
See Amex 1, 554 F3d at 308 ("[E]nforcement of the class action waiver would
effectively strip [plaintiffs] of the ability to assert their claims because 'each individual plaintiff
would have to incur discovery costs amounting to hundreds of thousands of dollars, despite
seeking average damages of only $5000."'), quoting Brief and Special Appendix for PlaintiffsAppellants, In re American Express Merchants' Litigation, No 06-1871, *17 (filed Sept 11,
2006) (available on Westlaw at 2006 WL 6198567); Amex II, 634 F3d at 197-98.
90 See text accompanying notes 69-74.
91 Concepcion, 131 S Ct at 1745, 1753 (citing the district court's description of AT&T's
arbitration provision as "quick, easy to use," likely to "promp[t] full or... even excess
payment to the customer without the need to arbitrate or litigate," and "sufficient to provide
incentive for the individual prosecution of meritorious claims" and a "better" option to
plaintiffs than class litigation).
92 Significantly, the Concepcion Court never cited Randolph. As a consequence, lower
courts are not free to determine that the Supreme Court in Concepcion implicitly overruled the
Randolph case-by-case test. See Agostini v Felton, 521 US 203, 237 (1997) (stating that lower
courts may not "conclude [that the Supreme Court's] more recent cases have, by implication,
overruled an earlier precedent" and must "leav[e] to this Court the prerogative of overruling
its own decisions"). See also Shalala v Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc, 529 US 1, 18
(2000) ("This Court does not normally overturn, or so dramatically limit, earlier authority sub
silentio").
93
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, AT&T Mobility LLC v Concepcion, No 09-893, *1
(filed Jan 25, 2010) (available on Westlaw at 2010 WL 6617833) (emphasis added). In their
petition, moreover, the Petitioners expressly distinguished Amex I as "based on federal law,
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language in Justice Scalia's opinion that gives the appearance that
the Court (or at least some members) would shrug off a showing that
an arbitration clause in a particular case would render a claim
unremediable.' And we expect that attempts to capitalize on this
language will provide a key battleground as the lower courts hash
out the contours of Concepcion.
3. Implications and scope of the federal vindication-of-rights
challenge.
So what does the continued vitality of a federal "vindication of
rights" challenge portend for the future of aggregate litigation? Any
such assessment necessarily begins with an understanding of just how
broadly or narrowly the challenge applies. Commentators and
advocates on both sides of the issue are likely to overplay the
breadth of the Amex exception to the general rule that arbitration
agreements are enforceable as written. Business interests will argue
that the exception is swallowing the rule and is poised to invalidate
class waivers in virtually every federal putative class case, given the
generally low per-plaintiff damages and the expense of prosecuting
most federal claims. Some plaintiffs will likewise peddle a reductivist
reading on which class action waivers are unenforceable in all cases
based on violations of federal statutory law.
But as Concepcion itself shows, not all claimants will pass the
"prohibitive expense test" contemplated in Amex I and other cases.
In particular, the Concepcion majority was clear that the
Concepcions were not prevented from being able to vindicate their
rights, thanks to the relative generosity of what we term a "bounty
clause" in their arbitration agreement, which provided that claimants
are entitled to a $7,500 cash bounty-plus double attorneys' fees-if
they receive an arbitration award superior to defendant's final preaward offer."5
Moreover, the pool of cases that will pass the prohibitive
expense test is set to shrink, post-Concepcion. We can expect that
corporate counsel seeking to cut off such challenges will use the
not state law," and as involving a "finding that the respondents could not vindicate their
antitrust claims on an individual basis." Id at n 7.
94
See Concepcion, 131 S Ct at 1753. Of course, the opinion did not reject or consider any
argument that class proceedings are necessary to prosecute the Concepcions' particular smalldollar claim. Nor did Justice Scalia say-in dicta or otherwise-that it would be immaterial if
the claimants could show that the instant claim required class treatment.
95 Id at 1744. Indeed, a district court judge described AT&T's arbitration provision as
"perhaps the most fair and consumer-friendly provisions this Court has ever seen."
Makarowski v AT&T Mobility, LLC, 2009 WL 1765661, *3 (CD Cal).
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bounty clause in Concepcion as a model.' And whatever the merits

of Justice Scalia's view that the bounty clause preserved the
Concepcions' ability to vindicate their rights, it is highly likely that
this dictum (for it was certainly not part of the holding in
Concepcion) will then prove irresistible to lower courts faced with
vindication-of-rights challenges in cases that feature a bounty
clause-or, at least, a clause that approximates the $7,500 magnitude
of the Concepcion clause.'
There are other measures that corporate counsel can similarly
be expected to take in seeking to remove vindication-of-rights
challenges from plaintiffs' arsenals. Foremost among them is
providing that all costs of suit are recoverable by a prevailing
plaintiff. In finding that the class waiver imposed prohibitive
expenses on plaintiffs in the Amex cases, the Second Circuit focused
on the fact that expert witness fees-the single biggest expense in
antitrust cases-would not be recoverable expenses under the
relevant statutory cost-shifting provisions." (In a class proceeding, by
contrast, those expert costs are recouped from the common fund
created by the settlement or judgment.) There is nothing to stop
companies from providing that all costs of suit shall be paid to a
prevailing claimant, whether or not statutorily enumerated." As with
bounty clauses, these sorts of provisions are likely to drive many
96

See, for example, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, U.S. Supreme Court Finds That

Class Action Waivers in Arbitration Agreements Are Enforceable under the FederalArbitration
at
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages
online
2011),
27,
Act
(Apr
/USSupremeCourtFinds-ClassActionWaiversInArbitrationAgreementsAreEnforceabeUnder
FederalArbitrationAct.aspx (visited Jan 8, 2012):
The wording of the majority decision in AT&T Mobility does not seem to require similar
provisions in an arbitration agreement, although the Court did observe that the district
court concluded that the guaranteed amounts would put the Concepcions in a better
position than if they were participants in a class action.
97
See, for example, In re Apple and AT&T iPad Unlimited Data Plan Litigation, 2011
WL 2886407, *4 (ND Cal) (enforcing an arbitration clause post-Concepcion that provided that
"if the arbitrator awards [plaintiff] more than [the] last settlement offer, plaintiffs are entitled
to double attorney's fees").
98 See Amex 1, 554 F3d at 315-18; Amex 11, 634 F3d at 198-99. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that the "costs" recoverable under 28 USC § 1920 and FRCP 54(d) exclude
expert witness fees and that the cost-shifting provisions of the Clayton Act simply do "not
permit a shift of expert witness fees." See West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc v Casey,
499 US 83, 94, 99-100 (1991); Crawford FittingCo v J. T. Gibbons, Inc, 482 US 437, 442 (1987).
99 See Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, Second Circuit Strikes Down Class Arbitration
Provisions in In re American Express Merchants Litigation *3 (Feb 26, 2009), online at
(visited Jan 8, 2012)
http://www.weil.com/files/upload/WeilBriefing-LitReg-090226.pdf
("Another option for businesses to consider, to the extent they wish to increase the possibility
that their class arbitration waiver provisions will be enforceable under In re American Express,
is the inclusion of a fee-shifting provision for attorneys' fees and expert costs.").
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courts to conclude that the waiver of the right to proceed collectively
does not impose "prohibitive costs" upon a claimant."n
One troubling upshot of judicial solicitude for cost-shifting
provisions as a means to avoid vindication-of-rights challenges lies in
cases where defendants' offers to shift costs are made post-contract,
during the course of litigating a motion to compel arbitration. Some
courts have been receptive to post-dispute offers to absorb costs,
believing that such offers moot vindication-of-rights arguments.'1
This view, however, appears irreconcilable with the uniform
recognition that courts must "look[] to the possible 'chilling effect' of
the cost-splitting provision on similarly situated potential litigants, as
opposed to its effect merely on the actual plaintiff in any given
case. ' ' "n This "chilling effect," of course, is accomplished when a
defendant distributes its contracts and is hardly ameliorated by a
post-dispute offer to absorb costs in a particular case.
In any event, as bounty, cost-shifting, and other "consumerfriendly" arbitration clauses proliferate, no one should expect
consumer groups to cheer this liberalization of arbitration clauses as
some sort of "race to the top." The race points elsewhere: bounty
and fee-shifting clauses are plainly intended to avoid liability and not
to select an alternative forum for the resolution of disputes. Indeed,
this is the whole purpose of mandatory arbitration clauses in
100See Christopher M. Mason and Benjamin R. Dwyer, U.S. Supreme Court Upholds
Class Action Waivers in Consumer Contracts: AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, Class Action
Alert *4 (Nixon Peabody LLP Apr 27, 2011), online at http://www.nixonpeabody.com
/linked media/publications/Class ActionAlert04_27_2011.pdf (visited Jan 8, 2012) (advising
that "[c]ompanies should consider tailoring their contracts to provide the individual customer
reasonable access to a fair and inexpensive dispute resolution process like the contract
addressed in Concepcion").
101 See, for example, Carter v Countrywide Credit Industries,Inc, 362 F3d 294,300 (5th Cir
2004) (noting that while cost allocation features of the "[a]greements would impose prohibitive
costs on [plaintiff]," this argument "has been mooted by [defendant's] representation to the
district court that it would pay all arbitration costs"); Phillips v Associates Home Equity
Services, Inc, 179 F Supp 2d 840, 847 (ND Ill 2001) (finding that an individual could not be
compelled to arbitrate if required to bear the prohibitive arbitration costs, but stating that the
court would reconsider its ruling if the defendants agreed to pay these costs). See also Kelly
Thompson Cochran and Eric J. Mogilnicki, Current Issues in Consumer Arbitration, 60 Bus
Law 785, 789 (2005) ("The case law is divided on a number of cost issues, particularly at what
point in time financial burdens should be assessed, and on whether the analysis should be
affected by offers to waive contractual cost provisions.").
102 Morrison v Circuit City Stores, Inc, 317 F3d 646, 657-58, 663 (6th Cir 2003) (en banc).
Courts uniformly recognize plaintiffs' burden is to "demonstrate that potential costs are great
enough to deter them and similarly situated individuals from seeking to vindicate their federal
statutory rights." Spinetti v Service Corp International,324 F3d 212, 217 (3d Cir 2003). See also
Kristian, 446 F3d at 52; Musnick v King Motor Co of Fort Lauderdale,325 F3d 1255, 1259-60
(11th Cir 2003); Bradford v Rockwell Semiconductor Systems, Inc, 238 F3d 549, 556 (4th Cir
2001); Delta Funding Corp v Harris,912 A2d 104,112-13 (NJ 2006).
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consumer and employment contracts. As Theodore Eisenberg,
Geoffrey Miller, and Emily Sherwin demonstrated in an empirical
study of arbitration provisions, among those companies whose
consumer agreements provided for mandatory arbitration, "less than
10% of their negotiated nonconsumer, non-employment contracts
included arbitration clauses."' 3 As those authors conclude, the
absence of arbitration provisions in "the great majority of negotiated
business contracts suggests that companies value, even prefer,
litigation as the means for resolving disputes with peers... [and]
casts doubt on the corporations' asserted beliefs in the superior
fairness and efficiency of arbitration clauses."'"
Nor should anyone expect that consumers will actually go
forward with one-on-one arbitrations, even as consumer arbitration
clauses are liberalized to provide ostensible incentives to initiate
proceedings in a bid to avoid legal challenges. The main problem will
be attracting plaintiffs' counsel: rational lawyers will be deterred by
prohibitive disincentives." The availability of attorneys' fees under
fee-shifting statutes is not a realistic inducement in consumer cases.'
Take Concepcion, for example: we imagine that attorneys for the
Concepcions would surely incur well over $25,000 in legal fees to
establish liability in a one-on-one proceeding." And yet, it is almost
103 Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller, and Emily Sherwin, Arbitration's Summer
Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts,
41 U Mich J L Ref 871, 876 (2008).
104 Id. For a countervailing view, and a methodological critique of the Eisenberg, Miller,
and Sherwin study, see Christopher R. Drahozal and Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use
(or Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 Ohio St J Disp Res 433, 446-74 (2010).
105 See Concepcion, 131 S Ct at 1761 (Breyer dissenting) ("What rational lawyer would
have signed on to represent the Concepcions in litigation for the possibility of fees stemming
from a $30.22 claim?"); Sutherland v Ernst & Young LLP, 768 F Supp 2d 547, 553 (SDNY
2011):

Even if [plaintiff] were willing to incur approximately $200,000 to recover a few thousand
dollars, she would be unable to retain an attorney to prosecute her individual claim....
[Plaintiff's counsel] will not prosecute her individual claim without charge, and will not
advance the required costs where the [arbitration] Agreement's fee-shifting provisions
present little possibility of being made whole.
Picardi v Eighth Judicial District Court, 251 P3d 723, 725 (Nev 2011) (noting plaintiffs'
argument that "the class action waiver was exculpatory because, in cases.., where the
individualized claims are relatively small, it is almost impossible to secure legal representation
unless those claims are aggregated with the claims of other similarly situated individuals").
106 See 29 USC § 216(b) (providing for the reimbursement of "reasonable" attorney's
fees).
107 The Concepcions' case is not as uncomplicated as it may appear. Plaintiffs pleaded
claims under the California Unfair Competition Law, Cal Bus & Prof Code § 17200 et seq;
False Advertising Law, Cal Bus & Prof Code § 17500 et seq; and Consumers Legal Remedies
Act, Cal Civil Code § 1770 et seq. See Laster, 2008 WL 5216255 at *1. The unfair competition
and false advertising claims were initially dismissed with leave to amend. The Consumers Legal
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impossible to imagine a court awarding $25,000 (or anything
remotely close) as a "reasonable fee" for obtaining a settlement of
$30.22."8
Thus, we concur with Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin that
"[1large corporations' assertions that mandatory consumer
arbitration is justified because it provides consumers with a superior
form of dispute resolution thus appear to be disingenuous."1n But
merits aside, the point here is that, in the wake of Concepcion, courts
faced with vindication-of-rights challenges are likely to give great
weight to bounty clauses and cost-shifting provisions, and to ignore
the shortcomings of statutory attorney fee-shifting remedies. Far
from presenting the proverbial hole you could drive a truck through,
the Amex exception at the end of the day might prove more like the
eye of a needle through which claimants must pass to gain refuge

from class action waivers.
B. State Law Cases Where the Waiver Immunizes the Defendant
Obviously, the first point of distinction in Amex-preemption
versus harmonization -is not available in cases raising state law
claims. But what about cases where a plaintiff can demonstrate, as a
factual matter, that the class action waiver confers upon a defendant
de facto immunity for violations of a state law? Here, the postConcepcion analysis is trickier.
The savings clause of the FAA provides that arbitration
agreements are enforceable "save upon such grounds as exist at law

Remedies Act claim was dismissed with prejudice because plaintiffs failed to comply with
certain statutory notice requirements. See id at *4. The defendants then moved to dismiss the
amended pleading based on a highly technical causation argument and a "safe harbor"
provision in California Civil Code § 1656.1. See Laster, 2008 WL 5216255 at *16. As to both
defenses, the court declined to dismiss the complaint "[a]t this stage of the proceedings,"
clearly signaling that a summary judgment motion would be entertained after a full evidentiary
record had been developed. See id. Given these complexities, our estimate of $25,000 in legal
fees is unrealistically low.
108 The amount of the settlement, moreover, will always be $30.22, and never $7,500, as
the defendant AT&T will always offer up full value to avoid the bounty. But it is not as though
a pro se filing will unearth an automatic $30.22, as AT&T can make its final offer on the eve of
arbitration, or even later.
109 Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller, and Emily L. Sherwin, Arbitration'sSummer
Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts *6
(Cornell Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No 08-017, New York University Law &
Economics Research Paper No 08-28, Dec 2007), online at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3
/papers.cfn?abstract.id=1076968 (visited Jan 8, 2012) (discussing the study of varying use of
arbitration clauses across contracts within the same firms). See also notes 103-04 and
accompanying text.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[79:623

or in equity for the revocation of any contract."... Concepcion then
adds the proviso that, even if a defense is generally applicable to
litigation and arbitration alike (as the California unconscionability
rule was), it loses the protection of the FAA saving clause if it
"stands as an obstacle" to the intent of Congress-which means, at
the very least, if it renders arbitration, as traditionally defined,
unavailable in some category of cases."
From this, we understand that a challenge to the enforceability
of an arbitration agreement after Concepcion must satisfy at least the
following conditions: (1) it must be based on a recognized defense to
contract, which is (2) generally applicable to contracts both in and
out of the arbitration context, and (3) it must not have the effect of
rendering arbitration, as traditionally defined, unavailable in some
category of cases.
It is fair to assume that each of these conditions will become a
battleground, as post-Concepcion plaintiffs argue that their ability to
prosecute claims under state law is impermissibly nullified by
arbitration agreements. A careful consideration of these requirements,
then, is imperative for determining the contours of a viable challenge
to class action waivers in state law cases, following Concepcion.
1. "Recognized defense."
Properly framed, the recognized contract defense that is
available in state law cases is that the class action waiver operates in
a particular case to exculpate or confer de facto immunity upon the
defendant, and so implicates a state common law policy against
exculpatory contracts. As Justice Thomas observed in his concurring
opinion in Concepcion, "[e]xculpatory contracts are a paradigmatic
example of contracts that will not be enforced because of public
policy.. 12 California Civil Code § 1688 codifies this common law
precept: "All contracts which have for their object, directly or
indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own fraud, or
willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation of
10 9 USC § 2 (establishing the enforceability of the arbitration provision with the only
way to invalidate a provision being under state contract law).
Ill See 131 S Ct at 1753.
112 Id at 1756 (Thomas concurring). In its decision in Amex I, the Second Circuit made a
similar point, albeit in the specific context of antitrust claims, where the Supreme Court has
long held that, "'in view of the public interest in vigilant enforcement of the antitrust laws
through the instrumentality of the private treble-damage action,' an agreement which confers
even 'a partial immunity from civil liability for future violations' of the antitrust laws is
inconsistent with the public interest." Amex 1, 554 FMd at 319, quoting Lawlor v National
Screen Service Corp, 349 US 322, 329 (1955).

2012]

After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of Concepcion

649

law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law.""' 3
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts contains similar language."'
The upshot here is that the "de facto immunity" or "exculpatory
contract" defense is, in most jurisdictions at least, a well-established
and recognized defense.
2.

"Generally applicable."

The FAA saving clause is limited to defenses that apply to "any
contract," as opposed to defenses that single out arbitration. The
Supreme Court has applied this principle to nullify state statutes that
"mak[e] written, predispute arbitration agreements invalid;' 1'
provide that a "contract may not be subject to arbitration" absent
notice on the front of the contract;"6 or that exempt any particular
type of case (for example, state labor cases) from "any private
agreement to arbitrate..... This line of cases "describels] the FAA as
a kind of equal protection clause that bar[s] state courts from
applying contract principles in a manner that discriminate[s] against
arbitration.'. 8 In all these cases, the Court warned against "rely[ing]
on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis" for
nonenforcement, as discriminating against arbitration would take
any challenge out of the savings clause."9
By contrast, a rule holding unenforceable any agreement that
confers de facto immunity on a defendant for violations of state law
is surely within the saving clause. In Concepcion, the majority did not
dispute that the general applicability requirement was met.
California's unconscionability rule applied to "any contract"
restricting collective action, in court or arbitration, and California
Cal Civil Code § 1688.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 196 ("A term unreasonably exempting a party
from the legal consequences of a misrepresentation is unenforceable on grounds of public
policy."); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 195 (adding a proviso regarding negotiated
versus nonnegotiated terms). See also F. Paul Bland Jr and Claire Prestel, Challenging Class
Action Bans in Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, 10 Cardozo J Conflict Res 369, 375-76 (2009)
(noting that "[miany states have a well-developed body of statutory or common law that deals
explicitly with 'exculpatory' agreements").
115 Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc v Dobson, 513 US 265,269 (1995).
116 Doctor's Associates, Inc v Casarotto, 517 US 681, 684, 688 (1996), quoting Mont Code
Ann § 27-5-114(4), amended by 1997 Mont Laws ch 19 (SB 135).
117 Perry v Thomas, 482 US 483, 484, 491 (1976) (holding that a state statute that
mandates wage disputes must be allowed to be litigated in a judicial forum is counter to the
FAA and thus preempted), quoting Cal Lab Code § 229.
118 David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 NYU L Rev 437,454 (2011) (arguing that
the Court's reading of the FAA has transformed the statute into a private delegation of
legislative power).
119 Perry,482 US at 493 n 9.
113
114
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courts had indeed struck down provisions that would ban class
actions in cases that did not implicate arbitration at all. 20
Rather, the lesson of Concepcion is that general applicability is
not enough: "Although § 2's saving clause preserves generally
applicable contract defenses, nothing in it suggests an intent to
preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the FAA's objectives.' 21 In other words, even if
the defense is generally applicable, it will lose the protection of the
saving clause if it undermines arbitration-a separate requirement
that we discuss immediately below.
3. "Obstacle to arbitration."
Concepcion is, at base, about obstacle preemption." In
evaluating a case-by-case defense under which plaintiffs must show
that the imposition of the class waiver confers de facto immunity, the
critical issue following Concepcion is whether the defense will be
deemed to "stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress," as
expressed in the FAA.'23 This inquiry turns on just what "stands as an
obstacle" means.
So what was it about the Discover Bank unconscionability
defense that made it an impermissible "obstacle," so as to trigger
preemption under the FAA notwithstanding its nondiscriminatory
general applicability within the meaning of the savings clause? This
much we know: it was not because the successful invocation of that
120

See America Online, Inc v Superior Court, 108 Cal Rptr 2d 699, 713 (Cal Ct App 2001)

(striking as unconscionable dispute resolution clause that would apply Virginia procedural law,
which does not allow for class actions); In re Yahoo! Litigation, 251 FRD 459, 469 (CD Cal
2008) (striking a class ban applicable in court as unconscionable and exculpatory); Elhilu v
Quizno's FranchisingCo, LLC, No 2:06-cv-07855, Doc 69, *8 (CD Cal 2008) (same).
121 Concepcion, 131 S Ct at 1748. See also id at 1758 (Breyer dissenting) ("[W]e should
think more than twice before invalidating a state law that does just what § 2 requires, namely,
puts agreements to arbitrate and agreements to litigate 'upon the same footing."').
122 Obstacle preemption exists "where 'under the circumstances of [a] particular case, [the
challenged state law] stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress."' Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council, 530 US 363,
373 (2000), quoting Hines v Davidowitz, 312 US 52, 67 (1941). To determine whether obstacle
preemption exists, the Supreme Court has instructed the lower federal courts to employ their
collective "judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and
identifying its purpose and intended effects." Crosby, 530 US at 373. See also Abbot by Abbot
v American Cyanamid Co, 844 F2d 1108, 1113 (4th Cir 1988) ("A decision about [obstacle
preemption] requires the court independently to consider national interests and their putative
conflict with state interests.... [P]reemption under [an obstacle preemption] theory is more an
exercise of policy choices by a court than strict statutory construction.").
123 Concepcion, 131 S Ct at 1753, quoting Hines v Davidowitz, 312 US at 67.
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defense in any given case would render an arbitration clause
unenforceable as written. Any such objection would be circular: it
would mean the defense is an impermissible obstacle because it is a
defense. Whenever any common law contract defense is successfully
invoked under the FAA saving clause-including fraudulent
inducement, duress, or anything else -the arbitration clause may not
be enforced as written, or sometimes at all. So unless we are to
rescind the savings clause, we must look elsewhere for the meaning
of "obstacle." In our view, the unconscionability defense in
Concepcion "stood as an obstacle," for preemption purposes,
because it was a categorical rule that applied to all consumer cases.
The sin of the Discover Bank rule was that it did not require the
claimant to show that the agreement operated as an exculpatory
contract on a case-specific basis. 4 As the Eleventh Circuit recently
held in one of the first cases to interpret Concepcion, the "Supreme
Court concluded that the triggering conditions of California's
Discover Bank rule imposed no effective limit on its application,"
and it "implied that although the Discover Bank rule was cast as an
application of unconscionability doctrine, in effect, it set forth a state
policy placing bilateral arbitration categorically off-limits for certain
categories of consumer fraud cases, upon the mere ex post demand
by any consumer."1u For this reason, the Eleventh Circuit recognized,
the "Court then held that.

..

this state-imposed policy preference

'interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus
creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA."' 2"
In essence the standard boils down to this. To support the
rejection of an arbitration provision under the savings clause, a
defense of exculpatory contract must: (1) be recognized as a ground
for the revocation of contracts as a matter of state law; (2) apply to
"any contract," in or out of arbitration; and (3) be supported by a
showing that the invocation of the arbitration clause in a specific case
would be exculpatory or would confer de facto immunity upon the
defendant.
An illustration will help prove the point: if California had a rule that all class waivers
in consumer contracts are presumed, ex ante, to have been procured by fraud and duress, the
Supreme Court would clearly hold that that rule stands as an obstacle to the FAA. And yet, no
one doubts that a case-specific showing that an arbitration agreement was fraudulently induced
or obtained by duress would present a viable-indeed paradigmatic-defense under the saving
clause. The same is true here. The case-specific invocation of an exculpatory contract defense
is no more affected by Concepcion than would be the case-specific defense of fraudulent
inducement or duress.
125 Cruz v CingularWireless, LLC, 648 F3d 1205,1211 (11th Cir 2011).
126 Id at 1211-12, quoting Concepcion, 131 S Ct at 1748.
124
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Of course, exculpatory contract defenses in state law cases
additionally face the same hurdles as federal vindication-of-rights
challenges discussed above. As in the case law under Randolph,
plaintiffs will presumably have the burden "to demonstrate that
potential costs are great enough to deter them and similarly situated
individuals from seeking to vindicate their... rights.' 27 In the
absence of such a showing, it would be hard to say how the contract
confers de facto immunity on a defendant. And in satisfying this
burden, claimants will run into the same issues engendered by
"consumer-friendly" bounty and cost-shifting clauses and the like.
C. Legislative Responses to Concepcion
To fully take the measure of aggregate litigation in a postConcepcion world, it is also necessary to consider the likelihood,
viability, and scope of legislative responses to Concepcion and the
proliferation of class action waivers in consumer contracts.
1. Possible federal or state legislation.
At the simplest level, of course, Congress could provide that
class action waivers shall be unenforceable -at least in standardform consumer and employment contracts. That is the gist of the
proposed Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, 28' which, after dying in

committee both in 2007 and 2009, was reintroduced immediately
after Concepcion. But observers appear uniform in their assessment
that this bill stands little chance of passage in the current political
environment."9 Nor does an amendment to Rule 23 appear in the
offing.
The fate of state legislation seeking to override Concepcion is
equally discouraging. At the outset, state laws making arbitration
127 Spinetti, 324 F3d at 217, citing Morrison, 317 F3d at 663. See also text accompanying
notes 98-102.
128 S 987, 112th Cong, 1st Sess, in 157 Cong Rec S 2929 (daily ed May 12, 2011).
129 See, for example, Editorial, Gutting Class Action, NY Times at A26 (cited in note 21)
(noting that the chances of federal legislation overriding Concepcion "aren't great in the
current political environment"). There have been numerous attempts to legislate in this area,
all of which have failed. See Alan S. Kaplinsky, The Use of Pre-dispute ArbitrationAgreements
by Consumer Financial Services Providers,in Alan S. Kaplinsky, John J. Roddy, and Julia B.
Strickland, 16th Annual Consumer Financial Services Institute 253, 311-12 (Practising Law
Institute 2011) (identifying various bills before the House in 2010-11 that sought to restrict or
prohibit arbitration, including HR 1020 and 991-which "would bar pre-dispute binding
arbitration clauses in certain consumer, employment and franchise contracts"; HR 1237which "would bar pre-dispute arbitration clauses in nursing home contracts"; HR 1214-which
"would bar from a payday loan contract a mandatory arbitration clause that is unfair,
unconscionable, or substantially in derogation of the rights of consumers").
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unavailable in some category of cases are doomed, as the Court
showed in Perry v Thomas,' " where it struck down a rule making

arbitration unavailable in wage-and-hour claims,"' and as it
reaffirmed in Concepcion, where it struck down a rule making
arbitration (or at least, one-on-one arbitration, which is now the only
kind that matters) unavailable in consumer cases.' 2
It is also not clear that state legislation will be much better
received where it specifically provides that class actions shall be
available as part of one remedial statute or another. A number of
federal courts have rejected similar arguments in the context of
claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938' 3 or other statutes
where the right to class-wide procedures is hardwired into the
remedial statute itself." In essence, these courts reason that the right
to proceed collectively, as provided for in the remedial statute, is not
"substantive" and is thus fully waivable - even as they conclude that
the right to proceed in arbitration, as provided for in the FAA, is a
substantive right. 3' Still, this issue is far from settled, and one can
imagine that state legislation fully incorporating class action rights
into substantive remedial statutes could possibly find some traction.
There exist other possibilities for state legislatures motivated to
help their citizens overcome Concepcion. One candidate would be
legislation providing that any dispute resolution provision in a
standard form agreement that has the effect in a particular case of
rendering a claimant unable to vindicate her rights under a state
remedial statute shall be unenforceable under the state's clearly
recognized policy against exculpatory contracts. Such a statute would
pretty clearly satisfy the three requirements described above.
Another approach would be that of California Assembly Bill 1062,"
which provides that denials of motions to compel arbitration are
130 482 US 483 (1987).
131 Id at 484. See also Southland Corp v Keating, 465 US 1, 16 (1984) ("Congress intended
to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration
agreements.").
132 Concepcion, 131 S Ct at 1753.
133 Pub L No 75-718, 52 Stat 1060, codified as amended at 29 USC § 201 et seq.
134 See, for example, 29 USC § 216(b) (providing that, under the Fair Labor Standards
Act, "[a]n action... may be maintained against any employer (including a public agency) in
any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in
behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated"); 29 USC § 157
(providing that, under the National Labor Relations Act, employees have the right "to engage
in... concerted activities for the purpose of ...mutual aid or protection").
135 See Carter,362 F3d at 298.
136 California Legislature, 2011-12 Regular Session (Feb 18, 2011), online at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/asmi/ab1051-1100/ab_1062_bill_20110901_amended
sen v96.pdf (visited Jan 6, 2012).
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unappealable until final judgment is entered.' 7 It is less clear that this
statute would make the grade; in particular, it is not clear how this
law would stand up to an argument that it discriminates against
arbitration.
2. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.
Another legislative option is presented in Title X of the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act'" of 2010,

which established the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB). The CFBP is an independent bureau within the Federal
Reserve designed to protect consumers in their transactions with
banks, credit card companies, mortgage brokers, and other financial
institutions. "9 It has broad authority to ensure that existing consumer
protection laws are rigorously enforced, and to regulate unfair,
deceptive, and abusive practices and consumer products"-it will be,
in the words of its creator, Elizabeth Warren,"' a "cop on the beat.' '1 2

137 See id. The Bill passed the Assembly 42-29 on May 26, 2011 and was referred to
committee on June 2, 2011. The sponsors argue that the purpose of the Bill was simply to fix an
"anomaly," as the general rule is that "appeals may only be taken once a final judgment is

rendered." Third Reading of AB 1062 *4, California State Legislature, Senate Rules
Committee, Office of Senate Floor Analyses (June 30, 2011), online at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov
/pub/11-12/bill/asm/ab_ 1051-1100/ab_1062_cfa_20110701_095933_sen floor.html (visited Jan 8, 2012).
But it seems more likely that this is a directed effort to limit appellate review in order to allow
the recovery of class remedies, reminiscent of a pre-Rule 23(f) era. See, for example, Matter of
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc, 51 F3d 1293, 1297 (7th Cir 1995) (holding that mandamus appeal
from grant of class certification was appropriate because an appeal from the final judgment
"will come too late to provide effective relief for these defendants [due to] the sheer magnitude
of the risk to which the class action, in contrast to the individual actions pending or likely,
exposes them").
138 Pub L No 111-203, title X, 124 Stat 1955, codified at 12 USC § 5301 et seq.
139 Dodd-Frank Act § 1021 et seq, 12 USC § 5511 et seq.
140 See Curtis W. Copeland, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act: Regulations to Be Issued by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau *2
(Congressional Research Service Aug 25, 2010), online at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc
/R41380.pdf (visited Jan 8, 2012) ("Section 1022 alone gives the CFPB broad rulemaking
powers, authorizing it to prescribe such rules 'as may be necessary or appropriate' to enable
the Bureau to administer federal consumer financial protection laws.").
141 The CFBP was the brainchild of Elizabeth Warren. See Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at
Any Rate, 5 Democracy 8, 16-18 (Summer 2007), online at http://www.democracyjournal.org
/pdf/5/Warren.pdf (visited Jan 8, 2012). Warren, who had earned a reputation as proconsumer
during her academic career, was feared by many business types as President Obama's obvious
choice to run the CFPB. She built the agency from scratch, serving as assistant to the President
and special advisor to the Treasury. See Jennifer Liberto, Consumer Bureau to Run-Director
or Not, CNN Money (June 15, 2011), online at http://money.cnn.com2Oll/06/15/news
/economy/consumerbureau/index.htm (visited Jan 8, 2012) (reporting that Republicans have
"lambasted Warren, and done whatever they can to stop President Obama [from] even
thinking about naming her to run the bureau").
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Furthermore, the agency has a great deal of independence,
as its
43
budget is "almost entirely out of the control of Congress."'
Not surprisingly, the CFPB has been enormously controversial,
as Republicans in Congress seek to "defund, delay, and defang" the
nascent agency.'"
Disputes loom concerning the agency's
independence from congressional and executive oversight;4

single-director

structure

of the

agency;'M and

the

lack

the

of

142 See Andrew Martin and Louise Story, Banks Bracefor Fight over an Agency Meant to
Bolster ConsumerProtection,NY Times B1 (June 18, 2009).
143 Jon Leibowitz, Speech, Helping Business Bear the New FinancialConsumer Protection
Regime *2, (Jan 20,2011), online at http/www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/ll0120financialregime.pdf
(visited Jan 9, 2012). See also Dodd-Frank Act § 1017(a), 12 USCA § 5497(a) (providing that
the director of the CFPB is entitled to request, and the Federal Reserve is required to transfer,
an amount "reasonably necessary" from the earnings of the Federal Reserve, up to a statutory
cap of 10 percent of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve for 2011, 11 percent in
fiscal year 2012, and 12 percent thereafter); Note, Administrative Law-Agency DesignDodd-Frank Act Creates the Consumer FinancialProtection Bureau, 124 Harv L Rev 2123,
2126 (2011) ("The degree of independence the Bureau holds is unlike that of a standard
independent agency because it is largely insulated from both executive and legislative control,
especially due to its independent revenue source."); Note, 124 Harv L Rev at 2127 (cited in
note 143) ("[Tlhe Dodd-Frank Act takes the rare step of exempting the Bureau from the most
powerful tool for congressional control -appropriations.").
144 Bernie Becker, et al, Overnight Money: Defund, Delay, Defang, The Hill (May 3,
2011), online at http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-moneyfbanking-financial-institutions/159097overnight-money-defund-delay-defang (visited Jan 9, 2012). In May 2011, forty-four Senate
Republicans sent a letter to President Obama declaring they "will not support the
consideration of any nominee, regardless of party affiliation," to direct the bureau until the
agency is restructured. Edward Wyatt and Ben Protess, Foes Revise Plan to Curb New Agency,
NY Times B1 (May 6, 2011), citing 44 U.S. Sens. to Obama: No Accountability, No
Confirmation, website of Senator Richard Shelby (May 5, 2011)
online at
http/shelby.senate.gov/pubhicindex.cfln/newsreleases?ID=893bc8b-2e73-4555-8441-d5leOccdldl7
(visited Dec 20, 2011) (providing the full text of the letter).
145 See, for example, Free Enterprise Fund v Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board, 130 S Ct 3138, 3142 (2010) (ruling that a regulatory board created by the SarbanesOxley Act contravened separation of powers by conferring executive power on agency officials
without subjecting them to presidential control).
146 See, for example, Victoria McGrane and Deborah Solomon, With New Power, GOP
Takes On Consumer Agency, Wall St J A5 (Nov 23, 2010) (reporting that members of the
House Financial Services Committee wrote the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department
questioning the legality of the CFPB); William Alden, GOP Lawmakers: Elizabeth Warren's
Job 'Undermines' Constitution, Huffington Post (Nov 23, 2010),
online
at
http://www.huffingtonpost.comi2010/11/23/elizabeth-warren-gop-_n_787571.html (visited Jan 9,
2012) (describing Representatives Spencer Bachus and Judy Biggert's opposition to the agency
and providing a letter sent by the Representatives to the Treasury and Federal Reserve
asserting that Warren's role as special advisor "circumvented the advice-and-consent process
and undermined one of the key checks and balances in our Constitution. While the Act confers
upon the Secretary of the Treasury limited interim authority 'to perform the functions of the
Bureau' (Section 1066(a)), Professor Warren is now exercising that authority"). For the
Treasury and Federal Reserve's response, see Letter from Eric M. Thorson, Inspector General
of the Department of the Treasury, and Elizabeth A. Coleman, Inspector General of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, to Representatives Spencer Bachus and
Judy Biggert (Jan 10, 2011), online at http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-
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congressional appropriations authority over the agency's budget.' 7

Notwithstanding the charged political atmosphere, the CFPB
officially launched on July 21, 2011, and on January 4, 2012,

President Obama appointed Richard Cordray, the former attorney
general of Ohio, as director of the agency.'"
Most pertinent here, § 1028 of the Dodd-Frank Act specifically
requires the CFPB to conduct a study of and submit a report to
Congress on the use of arbitration in consumer transactions, and
"prohibit or impose conditions or limitations on the use of...
arbitration of any future dispute between the parties, if the Bureau
finds that such a prohibition or imposition of conditions or
limitations is in the public interest and for the protection of
consumers.' ' .9 If, after careful study, the agency were to issue
regulations prohibiting the use of class action waivers in consumer
financial products, the Supreme Court's ruling in Concepcion would
be upended, at least for those contracts over which the CFPB has
direct authority."
structure/ig/Documents/OIG-CA%2011004%20Committee %20of%20Financial %20Services
%20Response%20CFPB.pdf (visited Jan 9, 2011).
147 See Note, Administrative Law, 124 Harv L Rev at 2126 (cited in note 143).
148 See Deborah Solomon and Maya Jackson Randall, Bank Challenger Picked to Run
Consumer Agency, Wall St J A2 (July 18, 2011). Cordray is also a controversial pick, as he was
a proconsumer state AG who brought a number of important lawsuits against industry. See id;
Michael Powell, The States vs. Wall St., NY Times B1 (Oct 12,2010):
Mr. Cordray in two years in office has demonstrated a willingness to sue early and often,
filing lawsuits against global financial houses, rating agencies, subprime lenders and
foreclosure scammers. He has wrested about $2 billion so far, a string of gilded pelts: a
$475 million Merrill Lynch settlement, $400 million from Marsh & McLennan and
$725 million from the American International Group.... Former Senator Michael
DeWine, a Republican who is running against Mr. Cordray, a Democrat, in the
November election, has implied that Mr. Cordray wields an antibusiness cudgel.
See Helene Cooper and Jennifer Steinhauer, Bucking Senate, Obama Appoints Consumer
Chief, NY Times Al (Jan 5, 2012) (reporting that President Obama appointed Richard
Cordray to serve as director of the CFPB while the Senate was in recess after Republicans had
refused to confirm Cordray since his nomination in July 2011).
149 Dodd-Frank Act § 1028(b), 12 USC § 5518(b). Notably, Dodd-Frank confers similar
authority on the SEC to ban mandatory arbitration in the securities context and flatly prohibits
mandatory arbitration in mortgage and home equity loan contracts. Dodd-Frank Act § 1414,
15 USC § 1639c(e). The Act also bans mandatory arbitration that would waive protections for
those who blow the whistle on securities fraud and commodities fraud. Dodd-Frank Act § 922,
15 USC § 78u-6; Dodd-Frank Act § 748, 7 USC § 26.
150 The Dodd-Frank Act expressly lists the "enumerated consumer laws" that are within
the agency's jurisdiction. See Dodd-Frank Act § 1002(12), 12 USC § 5481(12). The list includes
the following statutes: Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982, Pub L No 97-320,
96 Stat 1545, codified at 12 USC § 3801 et seq; Consumer Leasing Act of 1976, Pub L No 94-240,
90 Stat 257, codified at 15 USC § 1667 et seq; Electronic Fund Transfer Act, Pub L No 95-630,
92 Stat 3728 (1978), codified at 15 USC § 1693 et seq; Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub L
No 93-495, 88 Stat 1521 (1974), codified at 15 USC § 1691 et seq; Fair Credit Billing Act, Pub L
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And advocates on both sides are clearly anticipating that this is
exactly what the agency will do.'' While the CFPB has yet to issue
any statement on how it plans to conduct the arbitration study, ' in
May 2011, it established an Office of Research to "produce new
findings that deepen [the CFPB's] understanding of the problems
that consumers, firms, and markets encounter" by "conduct[ing]
rigorous policy evaluations."'' Presumably, this research arm will
conduct the arbitration study, focusing on class action waivers. It is
interesting to note, in this regard, that Deepak Gupta, the consumerrights attorney who argued the respondents' position in Concepcion
before the Supreme Court,' joined the General Counsel's office at
CFPB in late May 2011, shortly after the decision in Concepcion
came down. 55 Gupta has voiced strong views against class action
waivers.

56

No 93-495, 88 Stat 1511 (1974), codified at 15 USC § 1666 et seq; the Fair Credit Reporting
Act, Pub L No 91-508, 84 Stat 1128 (1970), codified at 15 USC § 1681 et seq; Home Owners
Protection Act of 1998, Pub L No 105-216, 112 Stat 897, codified at 12 USC § 4901 et seq; Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub L No 95-109, 91 Stat 874 (1977), codified at 15 USC § 1692
et seq.
151 See, for example, Barkley Clark and Barbara Clark, Prediction:Likely First Targets of
Bureau Rulemaking, 19-7 Clarks' Bank Deposits and Payments Monthly *7 (July 2010) ("We
have no doubt that one of the first rules out of the box will restrict or prohibit pre-dispute
arbitration clauses coupled with class action waivers in consumer financial services contracts.
This issue has been ablaze over the last several years."); Winston & Strawn LLP, The Bureau
of Consumer FinancialProtection:Broad Authority to Regulate Arbitration Agreements 2 (July
2010), online at http://www.winston.comlsiteFiles/Publications/ArbitrationClientBriefing.pdf
(visited Jan 9, 2012) ("The Bureau's consumer protection mandate may suggest that
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses may end up on the cutting room floor."); Daniel
Fisher, After Arbitration Ruling, Watch Warren's Consumer Bureau, Forbes (Apr 27, 2011),
online at http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2011/04/27/after-arbitration-ruling-watchwarrens-consumer-bureau/ (visited Jan 9, 2012).
152 Dodd-Frank is silent as to whether the CFPB must use an outside consultant to
conduct the arbitration study or whether the Bureau itself may perform the necessary review.
The legislation is also silent as to the breadth of the study, the manner in which the study is
performed, and whether any members of the industry will be asked to contribute to the study.
153 Raj Date, Independent Research at the CFPB (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
May 11, 2011), online at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/independent-research-at-the-cfpb/
(visited Jan 9,2012).
154 Gupta released this statement after the Court issued its decision in Concepcion:
Class actions are an essential tool for justice in our society. Brown v. Board of Education
was a class action. The fate of class actions should not be decided through the fine print of
take-it-or-leave-it contracts.... Public Citizen is committed to fighting against forced
arbitration, which every day is used to deny justice to consumers and employees. We will
continue to champion consumers' rights in every branch of government. We will not give up.
Deepak Gupta, In AT&T v. Concepcion, US. Supreme Court Deals Crushing Blow to
Consumers, Public Citizen (Apr 27, 2011), online at http://www.citizen.org/pressroom
/pressroomredirect.cfm?ID=3326 (visited Jan 9, 2012).
155 Deepak Gupta, Moving to CFPB, BlueMauMau (May 23, 2011), online at
http://www.bluemaumau.org/moving-cfpb (visited Jan 9, 2012) (stating on his blog that he will
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Still, even if the CFPB concludes that banning class action
waivers in consumer financial contracts is "in the public interest and
for the protection of consumers," any resulting rule will apply, under
a grandfather clause, only to contracts entered into more than 180
days after that rule is issued."' (One can only imagine the six-month
dash to insert waivers that will follow any rulemaking.) This
grandfather clause will prove especially impactful in the credit card
arena, where consumers enter into "evergreen" contracts that
remain in place for many years.
III. THE ENFORCEMENT GAP

Class actions are on the ropes. And it's not just because of class
action waivers. Whereas courts previously avoided any "preliminary
inquiry into the merits" at the class certification stage, recent years
have seen the development of a standard under which plaintiffs are

required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence-just as they
would at trial-any fact necessary to meet the requirements of Rule 23,
even if it also goes to the merits."' This requirement is at its most

be joining the CFPB and is "looking forward to the challenge of helping to build a new
consumer agency from scratch").
156 According to Gupta,
The legal issues before the Supreme Court in AT&T v. Concepcion may seem complex,
but what's really at stake is the ability of people to band together and challenge fraud,
discrimination and other wrongful practices.... Although not without abuses, class
actions have become an essential tool for resolving the common legal grievances of large
groups of people.... The fate of class actions should be decided by our elected
representatives, not by private legislation tucked into the fine print of take-it-or-leave-it
contracts.
Deepak Gupta, Letter to the Editor, Class-Action Lawsuits, NY Times (Dec 3, 2010), online at
http://www.nytines.com/2010/12/04/opinion/lwebO4class.htrnl (visited Jan 9, 2012). See also
Kate Davidson, High Court Gives Banks a Win, but Will It Last?, Am Banker 1 (Apr 28, 2011)
(quoting Gupta on the question of whether the CFPB has authority to ban certain forms of
arbitration: "Congress always has the authority to overturn a decision, but Congress has
delegated the authority to ban arbitration in certain contracts in this instance,... [s]o there is
nothing unusual about an administrative agency exercising authority delegated to it by
Congress").
157 Dodd-Frank Act § 1028, 12 USC § 5518. There is precedent for this approach to
consumer protection by "regulat[ing] contract terms directly, mandating, limiting, or
prohibiting terms including prices." Alan M. white, Behavior and Contract,27 Law & Ineq 135,
177 (2009) (citing the example of the FFC, which has authority to "simply prohibit[] terms that
cannot be viewed as benefiting consumers in a vast majority of situations").
158 See, for example, In re Initial Public Offerings Securities Litigation, 471 F3d 24, 41-42
(2d Cir 2006) (rejecting the "some showing" standard and adopting a requirement that
plaintiffs provide "definitive" proof, through "affidavits, documents, or testimony to...
[establish] that each Rule 23 requirement has been met"); In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust
Litigation, 552 F3d 305, 316, 320 (3d Cir 2008):
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potent in damages cases under Rule 23(b)(3), where plaintiffs are
obligated to establish the predominance of common issues."9 The
Supreme Court's recent decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc v Dukes,"
meanwhile, largely carries these heightened requirements over into
the injunctive realm, by redefining the hitherto easy-to-satisfy
commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2)."'
Further body blows to class action practice have been delivered
by the development in recent years of an "implicit requirement" of
ascertainability, under which courts in consumer cases have refused
to certify classes in the absence of "reliable proof of purchase or a
knowable list of injured plaintiffs.""' This ascertainability
requirement, which courts have generally grafted onto the Rule
23(b)(3) manageability requirement,' has sounded a death knell for
many (if not most) cases arising from small retail purchases. The
result has a certain dark irony. On the one hand, purchasers of
ordinary products-peanut butter, cough medicine, pineapples,
cookware, and aspirin'T -are likely unconstrained by class action
An overlap between a class certification requirement and the merits of a claim is no
reason to decline to resolve relevant disputes when necessary to determine whether a
class certification requirement is met.... Factual determinations necessary to make Rule
23 findings must be made by a preponderance of the evidence.
See also J. Douglas Richards and Benjamin D. Brown, Predominance of Common QuestionsCommon Mistakes in Applying the Class Action Standard,41 Rutgers L J 163,169 (2009).
159 See, for example, Reed v Advocate Health Care, 268 FRD 573, 596 (ND Ill2009)
(denying certification after weighing plaintiffs' method of proving injury and damages, and
competing expert testimony, and concluding that plaintiffs were unable to provide common
proof of their claims); Walsh v PrincipalLife Insurance Co, 266 FRD 232, 237 (SD Iowa 2010)
(investigating evidentiary submissions before denying class certification due to plaintiffs'
inability to satisfy the predominance requirement with evidence of injury common to the
class).
160 131 S Ct 2541 (2011).
161 See id at 2556-57 (2011). The Supreme Court clearly ramped up the requirements for
establishing "commonality" under Rule 23(a), but no matter how rigorous the showing under
Dukes, no one can argue that it is more exacting than the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance
requirement under the Initial Public Offering-Hydrogen Peroxide line of cases. See note 158.
Therefore, the impact of Dukes on Rule 23(b)(3) damages class actions appears minimal.
162 Myriam Gilles, Class Dismissed: Contemporary Judicial Hostility to Small-Claims
Consumer Class Actions, 59 DePaul L Rev 305, 331 (2010).
163 The manageability notion stems from the view that, in the absence of a known list of
injured consumers at the certification stage, "damages cannot reliably be distributed to
potential claimants at the subsequent remedial stage of the litigation." Id at 310.
164 See id at 312-13, citing In re Conagra Peanut Butter Products Liability Litigation,
251 FRD 689 (ND Ga 2008) (peanut butter); In re Phenylpropanolamine(PPA) Products
Liability Litigation, 214 FRD 614 (WD Wash 2003) (ingredient in cough syrup); In re Fresh Del
Monte Pineapples Antitrust Litigation, 2008 WL 5661873 (SDNY) (pineapples); In re Teflon
Products Liability Litigation,254 FRD 354 (SD Iowa 2008) (cookware). See also In re Bayer
Corp Combination Aspirin Products Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation, 701 F Supp 2d 356
(EDNY 2010) (aspirin).
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waivers. On the other hand, they're unlikely to have the proof of
purchase necessary to satisfy the ascertainability requirement-and
indeed, deceptive trade and antitrust cases based on all these
products have been dismissed on just such grounds."
The net result of all this standard tightening, predictably, has
been a drop-off in the number of class actions certified." Further
depressing class action activity, at least so far as state law claims are
concerned, is the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005"67 (CAFA), which
allows for the removal of most significant class filings to federal
court."'
All of this, coupled with the Supreme Court's embrace of class
action waivers, radically restricts the continued ability of private
actors to vindicate public rights via the class action mechanism. As
the private attorney general model recedes, the question naturally
emerges: Are there public actors poised to step into the enforcement
gap?

A. State Attorneys' General Parens Patriae Authority
In our view, state attorneys general-alone among public
enforcers-have the ability to fill the void left by class actions,
primarily through expanded use of the parens patriae powers that
are currently on the books in most states. Parens patriae suits are not
subject to Rule 23 or contractual waiver provisions, and so avoid the
majority of impediments to contemporary class actions. And while
Gilles, 59 DePaul L Rev at 312-13 (cited in note 162).
Although some studies show that the number of class actions filed has remained fairly
steady over the past three years, others reveal that, given the increased evidentiary and burden
of proof standards that plaintiffs must satisfy, a significant number of these classes are not
certified. Compare Fulbright & Jaworski LLP, 7th Annual Litigation Trends Survey Report
(2010), online at http://www.fulbright.com/litigationtrends (visited Jan 9, 2012), with Joel S.
Feldman, Simone R. Cruickshank, and Gary J. McGinnis, Evidentiary and Burden of Proof
Standardsfor Class Certification Rulings, 11 BNA Class Action Litig Rep 536, 541 (June 11,
2010). Securities fraud class actions appear to be the exception. See Jordan Milev, Robert
Patton, and Svetlana Starykh, Recent Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation: 2011 MidYear Review *1 (National Economics Research Associates July 26, 2011), online at http://
www.nera.com/nera-files/PUB_Mid-YearTrends_0711(3).pdf (visited Jan 9, 2012) (reporting
that securities class action filings remained steady and suggesting that "a wave of new cases
alleging breach of fiduciary duty in connection with" mergers and acquisitions is the cause).
167 Pub L No 109-2, 119 Stat 4, codified in various sections of Title 28.
168 CAFA § 4(a), 28 USC § 1332(d)(2). See also Emery G. Lee III and Thomas E.
Wilging, The Impact of the Class Action FairnessAct of 2005 on the Federal Courts: Fourth
Interim Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules *2 (Federal
Judicial Center 2008), online at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules
/Fourth%20Interim%20Report%20Class%20Action.pdf (visited Jan 9, 2012) (reporting an
increase in the number of removals to federal court immediately after CAFA was enacted,
followed by a flattening to pre-CAFA levels).
165
166
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states may lack the resources and expertise to step into the
enforcement gap, they have broad latitude to leverage the
substantial resources and expertise of the private bar -and do so in a
fashion that ameliorates the most criticized features of class action
practice. Whether state AGs will in fact use these tools and seize the
mantle of aggregate litigation is another question.
1. Parens patriae authority.
In parens patriae cases, the state AG is generally acting on
behalf of citizens of the state, seeking injunctive relief or damages."
In the typical formulation, parens patriae standing is said to exist
where the state is not merely a "nominal party" acting on behalf of a
private interest, but is rather asserting its "quasi-sovereign interest in
the health and well-being-both physical and economic-of its
residents in general.' '.. Where the state asserts parens patriae
authority as a matter of the common law, courts have wrestled with
this "quasi-sovereign interest" requirement. But as Margaret Lemos
has explained, "private interests can rise to the level of a quasisovereign state interest when sufficiently aggregated" and, as a
consequence, "the operative question is whether the injury in
question affects a 'sufficiently substantial segment of [the state's]
population.""'7 . In any event, most assertions of parens patriae
authority nowadays are grounded not in the common law, but in
statutes that "explicitly authorize the attorney general to sue on
behalf of the state's citizens to redress particular wrongs. ' I" And
here, where there is express statutory authorization, standing
concerns evaporate.'73

169 See Richard P. Ieyoub and Theodore Eisenberg, State Attorney General Actions, the
Tobacco Litigation, and the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 74 Tulane L Rev 1859, 1863-64 (2000).
Parens patriae derives from Latin, meaning "parent of the country." Alfred L. Snapp & Son,
Inc v Puerto Rico, 458 US 592, 600 (1982). See also Jack Ratliff, Parens Patriae: An Overview,
74 Tulane L Rev 1847, 1847 (2000).
170 Snapp, 458 US at 607.
171 Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State
Attorneys General, 126 Harvard L Rev *5 (forthcoming 2012) (on file with authors), citing
Snapp, 458 US at 608. Lemos interprets Snapp to support parens patriae authority where the
state "acts on behalf of 'its residents in general,' rather than 'particular individuals,' asserting a
'general interest' in the welfare of its citizens of the sort that a state might try to 'address
through its sovereign lawmaking powers."' Lemos, 126 Harv L Rev *5 (cited in note 171).
172 Lemos, 126 Harv L Rev *5 (cited in note 171).
173 Lemos has pointed out that, where parens patriae authority is grounded in federal or
state statutory law, "every court to consider the question has held [that] state actions under
such statutes present a case or controversy that satisfies the irreducible minima of Article III
standing in federal court." Id at *6 (citations omitted).
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In broad strokes, then, state AGs will generally have standing to
step into cases that could otherwise be prosecuted as class actions,
unless there is some statutory impediment. In state common law
cases, parens patriae authority should generally lie; after all, if
Rule 23(a)(1) numerosity would be satisfied, the "substantial segment
of the population" test is likely met.17' Likewise, the state remedial
statutes that are most prominent in class action practice- including
deceptive trade, antitrust, and wage-and-hour laws-are generally
covered by broad legislative grants of parens patriae authority.'
Where standing problems most impede parens patriae actions is
in federal cases based on a statute that expressly or impliedly
restricts the ability of state AGs to act. Most prominently, the
Clayton Act provides that state AGs have standing to pursue federal
antitrust claims on behalf of "natural persons" residing in their
states.7 The problem is that natural persons rarely have standing to
bring federal antitrust claims in the first place. Federal antitrust
standing is vested exclusively in "direct purchasers" (usually
businesses who bought from the defendant) while "indirect
purchasers" (usually consumers) generally lack standing under the

174 See, for example, People v Peter & John's Pump House, Inc, 914 F Supp 809, 812
(NDNY 1996) (noting "[t]here is no numerical talisman to establish parens patriae standing,"
and, citing Snapp, 458 US at 607, that "[a]lthough more must be alleged than injury to an
identifiable group of individual residents, the indirect effects of the injury must be considered
as well in determining whether the State has alleged injury to a sufficiently substantial segment
of its population").
175 See also In re Sclater, 40 BR 594, 596-97 (Bankr ED Mich 1984) (allowing state to
bring claim as parens patriae under state consumer protection law that was silent on AG's
authority).
176 15 USC § 15c. See also Hawaiiv Standard Oil Co of California, 405 US 251,264 (1972)
(insisting on a "clear expression of a congressional purpose" that a state may sue as parens
patriae to "recover damages for injury to its general economy" under the Clayton Act);
Californiav Frito-Lay, Inc, 474 F2d 774, 777-78 (9th Cir 1973) (same).
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federal antitrust laws.'" As a consequence, parens patriae actions are
effectively unavailable in most federal antitrust cases. 78
A handful of other federal statutes, including ERISA and the
Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act'" (RICO),
have also been read to preclude parens patriae standing.'" But as a
general matter, courts have allowed states to sue in parens patriae
"under federal statutes that create broad private rights of action but
are silent" on the capacity of AGs, including Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,8' 42 USC § 1983, the Fair Housing Act,"n and the
Americans with Disabilities Act,"n among others."
In sum, the authority of state AGs proceeding in parens patriae
to fill the enforcement gap is dependent on the nature of the claim at
issue. While certain statutory claims will pose challenges, AG
177 See Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act § 301, Pub L No 94-435, 90 Stat 1383
(1976), codified in relevant part at 15 USC § 15c (granting state AGs the right to bring treble
damages suits on behalf of "natural persons," as opposed to business entities, residing in their
states). See also Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, S 94-803, 94th Cong,
2d Sess (Jan 19, 1976) in 122 Cong Rec S 15974 (daily ed May 28, 1976); Katherine Mason
Jones, Federalism and Concurrent Jurisdiction in Global Markets: Why a Combination of
Nationaland Antitrust Enforcement Is a Model for Effective Economic Regulation, 30 Nw J Intl
L & Bus 285, 295 (2010) ("[Tlhe purpose of the grant of statutory parens patriae authority to
state attorneys general was 'to overcome obstacles to private class actions through enabling
state attorneys general to function more efficiently as consumer advocates."') (citations
omitted). One year later, the Supreme Court decided Illinois Brick v Illinois, 431 US 720
(1977), stripping indirect purchasers of standing under federal antitrust laws and eviscerating
Congress's earlier empowerment of state AGs. See id at 726-29.
178 Some state antitrust statutes echo this limitation, providing that parens patriae
standing is limited to natural persons. See, for example, Cartwright Act, Cal Bus & Prof Code
§ 16760(a)(1) (providing that an AG "may bring a civil action in the name of the people ... as
parens patriae on behalf of natural persons residing in the state ... to secure monetary relief
... for injury sustained by those natural persons"). Still, the Cartwright Act and many other
state statutes, unlike the federal law, expressly allow claims on behalf of indirect purchasers,
leaving a significant role for parens patriae suits in antitrust enforcement. Cartwright Act, Cal
Bus & Prof Code § 16760(a)(1).
179 Pub L No 91-452,84 Stat 922 (1970), codified as amended at 18 USC §§ 1961-68.
180 See, for example, Illinois v Life of Mid-America Insurance Co, 805 F2d 763, 766
(7th Cir 1986) ("[E]ven if the complaint did sufficiently allege an injury to the state in its quasisovereign capacity, it is not clear... that Congress, in enacting the RICO statute, intended to
permit such a parens patriae proceeding."); Connecticut v Physicians Health Services of
Connecticut, Inc, 287 F3d 110, 120-21 (2d Cir 2002) (finding that the state was a "nonenumerated part[y] [which] lack[ed] statutory standing" under ERISA).
181 Pub L No 88-352,78 Stat 253, codified at 42 USC § 2000a et seq.
182 Pub L No 90-284,82 Stat 81 (1968), codified as amended at 42 USC § 3601 et seq.
183 Pub L No 101-336, 104 Stat 327 (1990), codified as amended at 42 USC § 12101 et seq.
184 See Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 NYU L Rev 698,710-11
(2011). See also EEOC v Federal Express Corp, 268 F Supp 2d 192, 197-98 (EDNY 2003)
(Title VII); Pennsylvania v Porter,659 F2d 306, 318 (3d Cir 1981) (42 USC § 1983); Support
Ministries for Persons with AIDS, Inc v Village of Waterford, New York, 799 F Supp 272, 277
(NDNY 1992) (Fair Housing Act); Vacco v Mid Hudson Medical Group, PC, 877 F Supp 143,
149 (SDNY 1995) (Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act).
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standing is not much in doubt in key areas of current class action
practice, including consumer and employment cases. There are
questions remaining: To what extent do the challenges that have
hobbled class actions pose a threat to parens patriae actions? And,
what are the legal and political constraints on the ability of state
AGs to lever the resources and expertise of the private bar to pursue
parens patriae cases?
2. Parens patriae and the challenges to class actions.
As enforceable class action waivers proliferate, we think it is
only a matter of time until a defendant makes the argument that a
state AG's parens patriae action is barred by the uniform terms of
the contracts between the defendant and the AG's constituent
consumers and workers. Facing parens patriae claims that might
otherwise have been brought by persons that are bound by
arbitration clauses and class action waivers, defendants will argue
that agency principles apply,'85 under which an agent is deemed
bound by the arbitration agreements of the principal."u
But the centuries-old doctrinal underpinnings of parens patriaen
are incompatible with any notion of agency. The whole idea behind
parens patriae suits is that the state has its own interest at stake in
the litigation. The state's "quasi-sovereign" interest supporting the
claim is not derived from an agency relationship with third-party
constituents. Instead, the state's own interest kicks in once a
sufficient number of its constituents have suffered injury. Moreover,
the sine qua non of agency is control; there is no agency relationship
absent an "understanding of the parties that the principal is to be in
control of the undertaking."' " In a parens patriae case-as in a
185 Courts often recite a litany of five grounds upon which a nonsignatory to an arbitration
agreement can be deemed bound to arbitrate under that agreement: "(1) assumption; (2) agency;
(3) estoppel; (4) veil piercing; and (5) incorporation by reference." Zurich American Insurance
Co v Watts Industries, Inc, 417 F3d 682, 687 (7th Cir 2005). Of these, agency is the only
potentially applicable ground for assertions that the state AG is bound to class waivers in
underlying agreements.
186 See Pritzker v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc, 7 F3d 1110, 1121 (3d Cir
1993) ("Under traditional agency theory.... [b]ecause a principal is bound under the terms of
a valid arbitration clause, its agents.., and representatives are also covered under the terms of
such agreements.").
187 See Sara Zdeb, Note, From Georgia v. Tennessee Copper to Massachusetts v. EPA."
Parens Patriae Standing for State Global-Warming Plaintiffs, 96 Georgetown L J 1059, 1068
(2008) ("Parens patriae originated as an English common law doctrine which allowed the
Crown to assert the rights of subjects who were incapacitated.").
188 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1. See also Azuna, LLC v Netpia.com, Inc, 2009
WL 2474634, *3 (ED Pa):
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criminal prosecution, and quite unlike an ordinary private lawsuitthe injured party is simply not "in control of the undertaking."'' And
indeed, this precept finds support in EEOC v Waffle House, Inc,"'
where the Supreme Court held that an employee's arbitration clause
did not bar the EEOC from seeking victim-specific damages.9 ' So
class waivers, in our view, are unlikely to affect parens patriae suits."n
Absent a radical expansion of current doctrine, parens patriae
suits are likewise impervious to the increasingly restrictive rules
governing class certification, including the ascertainability requirement. It is hard to see why it should matter if an AG has a knowable
list of persons affected by an unfair trade practice or environmental
nuisance, so long as the AG can ascertain the amount of aggregate
damages suffered by his citizenry. A court in a class action may feel
obliged to ensure that any relief will ultimately be distributed to the
injured parties, and it may conclude that problems identifying those
parties render the class device unmanageable within the meaning of
Rule 23(b)(3). But state AGs generally have no obligation to
distribute damages at all' 93-much less are they obligated to do so

In the absence of an agreement between DAK and Azuna or evidence that DAK had
control or supervision over Azuna, the Court cannot conclude that there is an agency
relationship binding DAK to an agreement to arbitrate entered into by Azuna.
Therefore, DAK is not bound by the arbitration agreement under an agency theory.
189 As Lemos points out in a related context, "parens patriae group members have no
ability to replace the attorney general as their representative if they are displeased with his
work." Lemos, 126 Harv L Rev at *14 (cited in note 171).
190 534 US 279 (2002).
191 Id at 295-96. We thank Brian Fitzpatrick for making this important connection.
192 Still, we can imagine defendants trying to analogize AGs to trade associations.
According to the Supreme Court:
[A]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its
members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it
seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim
asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the
lawsuit.
Hunt v Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 US 333,343 (1977).
193 For example, California's Cartwright Act provides that
Monetary relief recovered by the Attorney General ...shall be distributed ...[iln any
manner as the superior court having jurisdiction over the action in its discretion may
authorize to insure, to the extent possible, that each person be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to secure his or her appropriate portion of the monetary relief. In exercising
its discretion, the court may employ cy pres or fluid recovery mechanisms as a way of
providing value to persons injured as a result of a violation of this chapter.
Cal Bus & Prof Code § 16760(e)(1).The statute further specifies that any remaining sums "not
exhausted by distribution" escheat to the state. Cal Bus & Prof Code § 16760(e)(3). See also
Ariz Rev Stat Ann §§ 41-191.01 to 41-191.02 (establishing a revolving fund for the deposit of
monies received by the state as a result of the enforcement of federal or state antitrust statutes
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with any precision. Liberal use of cy pres, escheatment to the public
fisc, and the application of rough justice principles in distributing
awards are unquestioned hallmarks of parens patriae litigation.'"
And while the defendant surely has a due process interest in
ensuring that it does not incur liability greater than the aggregate
damages it inflicted upon affected state residents, it surely has no
interest in the AG's subsequent disposition of those damages.
A more complicated problem is presented by the potential
application, in parens patriae cases, of the heightened proof
standards demanded by In re Initial Public Offerings Securities
Litigation'9' and In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation " for

the certification of damages classes, and by Dukes for injunctive
cases." As AG-initiated suits come to take the place of private class
actions, we expect a push from defendants to subject parens patriae
cases to a sort of shadow Rule 23 standard, arguing for threshold
determinations that mirror commonality and predominance
inquiries. Indeed, we have already seen defendants argue that parens
patriae cases should be removable under CAFA because they
resemble class actions; that is, that parens patriae cases are often
"class actions in disguise" and, when they are, they should be
regulated like class actions. And while this view has been rejected by
most courts,'98 it was accepted by the Fifth Circuit in Louisiana v

and mandating that a portion of any antitrust recovery be set aside for antitrust enforcement
activities).
194 See, for example, Boyle v Giral,820 A2d 561, 566-67 (DC 2003) (affirming settlement
of a parens patriae suit where defendants "vigorously attack[ed] the cy pres distribution
approved by the trial court, and contend[ed] that D.C.Code § 28-4507(b)(2)(B) 'mandates' that
members of the consumer class receive direct monetary relief," and finding that the trial court
exercised properly its discretion in awarding cy pres where "[iut would be utterly impracticable
for the [slettlement to provide individual compensation to the [c]onsumer [s]ettlement [c]lass
members"). See also Albert A. Foer, Enhancing Competition through the Cy Pres Remedy:
Suggested Best Practices,24 Antitrust 86, 87 (Spring 2010):
Some courts in parens patriae cases have ordered the entire damage award to be used for
public interest purposes, such as education with respect to the industry in which liability
was established, even though the consumers on whose behalf the case was brought did not
recover their actual damages. In other instances, cy pres distributions have been ordered
to be used by state attorneys general to fund antitrust enforcement.
(citation omitted).
195 471 F3d 24 (2d Cir 2006).
196 552 F3d 305 (3d Cir 2008).
197 See notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
198 See Alexander Lemann, Note, Sheep in Wolves' Clothing: Removing Parens Patriae
Suits under the Class Action Fairness Act, 111 Colum L Rev 121, 122 n 9, 134 (2011) (citing
cases rejecting the argument that parens patriae suits should be treated as class actions for
purposes of CAFA removal).
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Allstate Insurance Co," and has found predictable traction in
conservative circles 2' -which implies it could well receive a favorable
reception in the Roberts Court.
If the "class actions in disguise" argument takes hold, why stop
at removability under CAFA? Why not subject parens patriae
actions to something like commonality and predominance inquiries?
It is not difficult to imagine courts conducting an early-stage hearing
into parens patriae standing, and demanding the AG make a
showing that the injuries to his constituents are capable of cohesive
common proof that predominates over individual inquiries, as a
prerequisite to finding that the state's quasi-sovereign interests are
implicated. The numerosity requirement is already baked into the
standing inquiry, and courts arguably have inherent power to police
manageability in any case, even without Rule 23. Presumably, courts
would borrow from class action case law the requirement that the
AG make these showings by a preponderance standard. 1
One place where AGs do have to make a Rule 23 showing is
where the parties wish to endow their settlement with the res
judicata reach of a class action settlement.2' This may not be easy:
the Texas Supreme Court, for one, has held a state AG is not a
"typical" class representative within the meaning of Rule 23, or
Texas's analogue. 3 However, post- Concepcion, obtaining a classwide global release will often be less consequential, given the
reduced risk of additional litigation by nonreleased parties.
Whatever the merits of grafting Rule 23-like requirements onto
parens patriae cases, this approach is certainly attuned to the legal
zeitgeist and, in our view, represents a plausible outcome. But the
effect will be limited and will not reach class action waivers. No
199 536 F3d 418 (5th Cir 2008).
200 See, for example, id at 424, quoting 151 Cong Rec S 1163-64 (daily ed Feb 9, 2005)
(Sen Hatch):
If this legislation enables State attorneys general to keep all class actions in State court, it
will not take long for plaintiffs' lawyers to figure out that all they need to do to avoid the
impact of [CAFA] is to persuade a State attorney general to simply lend the name of his
or her office to a private class action.
See also McGlinchey Stafford PLLC, Are ParensPatriaeSuits Just Class Actions in Disguise?,
CAFA Law Blog (Feb 21, 2011), online at http://www.cafalawblog.com/legal-publications-andarticles-are-parens-patriae-suits-just-class-actions-in-disguise.htm (visited Jan 9, 2012).
201 See Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F3d at 320.
202 Courts generally hold that res judicata, in the aggregate litigation context, applies only
where the potentially barred party was given notice and the opportunity to opt out. See Brown
v Ticor Title Insurance Co, 982 F2d 386, 390 (9th Cir 1992) ("[I]f the plaintiff was not
adequately represented in the prior action or there was a denial of due process, then the prior

decision has no preclusive effect.").
203

See Farmers Group,Inc v Lubin, 222 SW3d 417, 425 (Tex 2007).
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matter how heavily the parens patriae standing inquiry borrows from
Rule 23, it is clear that the state itself has an interest in redressing
widely distributed harms to its citizens and, as a consequence,
remains beyond the reach of contractual arbitration clauses.
Likewise, there is nothing here to alter the analysis of the
ascertainability requirement. The state's ability to make even a
rigorous showing of cohesiveness (or numerosity, or commonality)
simply will not depend on "proof of purchase" evidence or known
lists of injured persons.
B.

Private Lawyers and Public Enforcement in Parens Patriae

So state AGs can use parens patriae to get at many or most of
the cases that would otherwise be the subject of class actions, and
they can do so unconstrained by class action waivers and, at least for
now, the other, lesser challenges that afflict class actions. But do
state AGs have the resources and political will to step meaningfully
into the enforcement gap?
At the outset, we take it as a given that state AGs generally"
lack the resources to take the laboring oar on many of the large-scale
cases that have traditionally been the province of the class action
plaintiffs' bar."5 Chronically underfunded, state AGs have typically
been consigned to a supporting role in complex class litigations.'

204 Of course, state AG offices vary tremendously in terms of resources and expertise.
New York, for instance, is set up to litigate complex and expensive matters. See Peter J. Brann,
State Attorneys GeneralConsumer Protection Under a New Administration:New Opportunities
and New Challenges, Columbia Law School State Attorney General Project *2-7 (Oct 31,
2008), online at http://www.law.columbia.edu/null?&exclusive=filemgr.download&fileid=55833
&rtcontentdispositi (visited Jan 9, 2012) (discussing differences in resources among state AG
offices).
205 See Lemos, 86 NYU L Rev at 761 (cited in note 184) ("[Sjtate attorneys general face
resource constraints that limit the scope of possible enforcement actions."); Marc Dann,
Attorney General of Ohio, Address to the City Club of Cleveland *5 (June 29, 2007), online at
http://www.legalnewsline.com/content/img/f197459/dannspeech.pdf
(visited Jan 9, 2012)
("[Industry groups] know that public officials don't have the resources to finance complicated
law suits [sic] that often take years to work their way through the courts."); David B. Wilkins,
Rethinking the Public-PrivateDistinction in Legal Ethics: The Case of "Substitute" Attorneys
General, 2010 Mich St L Rev 423, 431 ("[Dlefendants in [complex class actions] have deep
pockets and are capable of hiring the best legal talent can buy to wear down their opponents,
even when that opponent is the state.").
206 See Jay L. Himes, When Caught with Your Hand in the Cookie Jar... Argue Standing,
41 Rutgers L J 187, 217 (2009) ("[Iun recent years, the states' major pharmaceutical-drug
antitrust cases have followed on-going private litigations and were generally settled along with
the private actions."); Settlement Agreement between Plaintiff States and Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co, Watson Pharma, Inc and Danbury Pharmacal, Inc Regarding Buspar, In re
Buspirone Litigation, No 01-CV-11401 (SDNY Mar 7, 2003) (establishing that state AGs
settled multistate monopolization action against pharmaceutical companies, together with
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And these budgetary constraints are only getting worse in the
current economic climate. So it is unrealistic to expect state AGs to
step into the breach with their own resources.'
But state AGs are, by and large, free to leverage the capital
resources, expertise, and workforces of the private bar, on a no-cost
basis.' Putting aside politics-which we discuss below-there is little
to stop state AGs from engaging private law firms on a contingent

fee basis to pursue claims in parens patriae on behalf of injured state
residents.'

The principal legal constraint is the requirement,

imposed by several courts, that the AG must maintain total control
over all key decision making lest the retainer agreement violate
public policy as an unlawful delegation of the AG's authority."'

There is no prohibition on outside counsel doing the work-that is,
finding and vetting the case, writing the court papers, conducting the
discovery, or trying the case-so long as it is subject to the ultimate

private class actions, for $100 million and injunctive relief); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust
Litigation, 481 F3d 355, 357 (6th Cir 2007) (noting that fifty-two state AGs filed their own
multistate action after the FTC and private class actions had been initiated). See also Steven B.
Hantler, Mark A. Behrens, and Leah Lorber, Is the "Crisis" in the Civil Justice System Real or
Imagined?, 38 Loyola LA L Rev 1121, 1160-61 (2005) (listing examples of state AGs
piggybacking on regulatory and litigation activity by federal entities and private lawyers).
207 Wilkins, 2010 Mich St L Rev at 427 (cited in note 205) ("Given both shrinking state
budgets and the growing list of potential big-ticket claims involving alleged harms to
consumers or the environment, the number of Attorneys General seeking to create
[contingency fee] arrangements of this kind will, in all likelihood, only increase.").
208 Id (noting that while defendants have argued that AGs lacked "the statutory or
constitutional authority to delegate [ ] public duties to these private parties," AGs have
generally been able to defeat these arguments). But see Martin H. Redish, Private Contingent
Fee Lawyers and Public Power: Constitutionaland PoliticalImplications, 18 Sup Ct Econ Rev 77,
101-06 (2010) (asserting constitutional problems with AGs hiring private counsel on
contingency).
209 See Wilkins, 2010 Mich St L Rev at 426 (cited in note 205) (describing various
instances of state AGs hiring private counsel on contingency and noting that "in recent years,
arrangements of this kind have become increasingly common").
210 See, for example, County of Santa Clara v Superior Court, 235 P3d 21, 36 (Cal 2010),
cert denied, 131 S Ct 920 (2011) (upholding contract where the county hired outside counsel on
contingency in public nuisance actions against lead paint manufacturers because "neutral,
conflict-free government attorneys retain[ed] the power to control and supervise the
litigation"); State v Lead Industries Association, Inc, 951 A2d 428, 477 (RI 2008) (upholding
legality of contingency fee agreement between state and outside counsel where AG maintains
"absolute control" over the litigation). David Wilkins argues that contingency fee
arrangements are superior to hourly fee arrangements:
[E]ven if a state or municipality were able to find lawyers with the requisite expertise and
experience who were willing to work for an hourly rate that the government was willing
or able to pay, officials would still have to fund the significant up-front costs and expenses
that often are required to mount cases of this kind out of public coffers.
Wilkins, 2010 Mich St L Rev at 432-33 (cited in note 205).
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control of the AG, who also must retain the last word on any
settlement."'
There is much to commend this model of public retention of
private counsel. Provided that the AG supervision requirement is
taken seriously-and it is quite cynical to expect it would not bethe model installs a responsible elected official in a role that
promises to moderate the worst abuses of class action practice.
Traditionally, in class actions outside the securities field, 2 ' law firms
vie with one another for lead counsel positions, cutting coalition
deals based not on operational merits but on the terms of the last
coalition deal and the one before that."3 The public-private
partnership model, properly implemented, has the potential to
replace that unseemly scrum with a transparent process, in which the
AGs select their cocounsel in conformity with whatever state laws
and practices might exist governing state contracting. 1 ' (On the other

hand, if improperly implemented, this model courts "pay-to-play"
type abuses, where state officials extract benefits for bestowing
lucrative engagements upon favored members of the private bar.) '
211 For cases upholding contingency fee agreements between AGs and private counsel,
see City of Grass Valley v Newmont Mining Corp, 2007 WL 4166238, *1 (ED Cal); SherwinWilliams Co v City of Columbus, Ohio, 2007 WL 2079774, *2-4 (SD Ohio); City and County of
San Francisco v Philip Morris, Inc, 957 F Supp 1130, 1135 (ND Cal 1997); State v Hagerty,
580 NW2d 139, 148 (ND 1998); Kinder v Nixon, 2000 WL 684860, *8 (Mo Ct App).
212 The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub L No 104-67,
109 Stat 737, codified in various sections of Title 15, provides that the lead plaintiff-the class
member with the largest claimed loss who seeks the position-shall "select and retain counsel
to represent the class." PSLRA § 27, 15 USC § 77z-1. The PSLRA "transformed the lead
plaintiff process from a 'race to the courthouse' to an orderly procedure." David H. Webber, Is
"Pay-to-Play" Driving Public Pension Fund Activism in Securities Class Actions? An Empirical
Study, 90 BU L Rev 2031, 2038 (2010).
213 See, for example, In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litigation, 197 FRD 71, 75 (SDNY
2000). The lead counsel selection process has been described as:

[T]ypically occur[ing] in one of two ways, neither of which necessarily leads to an optimal
outcome. Often, interested counsel jockey for the lead counsel position, leaving the court
to choose one of the contenders, sometimes with little guidance.... Alternatively, the
plaintiffs' lawyers negotiate among themselves to select lead counsel or a team of lead
counsel, and the choice is presented as a fait accompli for the court summarily to endorse.
Id. The court added that "[gliven the potential for massive plaintiffs' recoveries in such cases,
the lead counsel position may involve a potentially large attorney's fee. The role therefore has
become a coveted prize to be fought over or bargained for among competing plaintiffs
attorneys." Id.
214 See, for example, Va Code § 2.2-510.1 (requiring any contingency fee between a state
agency and a private attorney where the fees are "reasonably anticipated to exceed $100,000"
to be subject to "an open and competitive negotiation process" in accordance with the Virginia
Public Procurement Act, Va Code § 2.2-4300 et seq).
215 On this point, Samuel Issacharoff observes that this model places AGs in the role of
gatekeeper and warns that, sooner or later, gatekeepers tend to become toll collectors. See
Email from Samuel Issacharoff, Professor at New York University School of Law, to Myriam
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In terms of case selection too, the responsible AG acts as a
filter-a bulwark against unmeritorious cases on which private
lawyers might otherwise "take a flier" in order to exploit in terrorem
effects. And at the settlement stage, class counsels' rational
economic interests might drive them to eschew injunctive relief in
favor of damages, but the final-cut authority belongs to the AG,
ameliorating a principal basis for the agency costs critique of class
actions.216
The opportunity to augment scant public resources with the
fruits of successful parens patriae litigations is, moreover, a public
good that offers political benefits.21 ' Newspaper accounts
accompanying the installation of former Ohio AG Richard Cordray
to run the CFPB, for instance, spoke glowingly about his. having
"recovered more than $2 billion for Ohio retirees, investors and
business owners. ' ' 128 Similar praise followed other active AGs 19 The
Gilles, August 2011 (on file with authors). In a general sense, this is surely correct-and it
corroborates our, and Issacharoff's, strong preference for broad-based private enforcement.
See Gilles, 100 Colum L Rev at 1414-24 (cited in note 7). But the point here is that the broadbased private enforcement option is off the table after Concepcion.
216 David Wilkins provides an example for avoiding conflicts between private and public
lawyers at the settlement stage: when Nevada hired the law firm Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll
PLLC to act as "special attorneys general" in its lawsuit against mortgage lenders engaged in
fraudulent lending practices, the contract gave the AG "final and exclusive authority over all
aspects of [the] case, including settlement decisions." Wilkins, 2010 Mich St L Rev at 443, 462
(cited in note 205) (noting that "the agreement g[ave] the Attorney General the right to
control all major elements of the litigation, including whether and on what terms the case will
be settled"). The contract also provides that should the AG decide to settle the case for
injunctive relief, "Cohen [ ] Milstein will receive 'costs and hourly fees at fair market value of
their legal services expended on behalf of the state."' Id at 443 n 88. This protects the firm
from nonpayment, while allowing the public officials to extract the best settlement for their
constituents. It also balances the conflicts that may arise when there are both compensatory
and public interest motivations for the litigation.
Whether by adjudication or settlement, there may be questions of whether to pursue
injunctive relief, money damages, or both. A person committed to the cause may give
greater weight to injunctive remedies. A person seeking to maximize monetary recovery
may give less weight to injunctive remedies or, in a class action or other context requiring
court approval, may even prefer to include illusory injunctive remedies combined with
significant money damages.
Howard M. Erichson, Doing Good, Doing Well, 57 Vand L Rev 2087,2103 (2004).
217 See, for example, Wilkins, 2010 Mich St L Rev at 433 (cited in note 205):
Public lawyers also have political incentives for bringing in high profile private lawyers to
assist them in high profile cases.... Not surprisingly, in seeking to woo voters, these
lawyer/candidates are quick to tout their experience in helping to shape public policy by
curbing corporate abuses through litigation against defendants like tobacco companies
and mortgage lenders.
218 See, for example, Editorial, Consumer Watchdog: Ex-Ohio AG Is a Smart Choicefor
Key Agency, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette B6 (July 25, 2011) ("Mr. Cordray's reputation as a
consumer advocate is that he's tough, smart and honest. As Ohio attorney general, he
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retention of expert, highly specialized trial lawyers extends this
benefit, allowing AGs around the country to take leadership
positions in the sort of complex, big-ticket cases that are likely to
contribute meaningfully to state coffers.
On the other hand, there may be political risk in hiring outside
firms.' The poster child here is the tobacco litigation, where state
AGs hired well-known plaintiffs' lawyers to sue the cigarette
manufacturers on a subrogation theory. Although the private
lawyers were able to wrest a $246 billion settlement from an industry
that had enjoyed total success for decades in fending off any
damages liability, critics balked at the $14 billion in aggregate fees
paid to outside counsel under contingent fee agreements."I Fierce

lobbying and popular outcry drove some jurisdictions to place limits
on the ability of AGs to hire outside counsel,'

and led President

successfully sued financial giants Bank of America and American International Group. And he
took on the major securities-rating agencies."); Michael Powell and Mary Williams Walsh,
A.I. G. to Pay $725 Million in Ohio Case, NY Times B1 (July 17, 2010) (announcing settlement
between the American International Group and three Ohio pension funds in suit brought by
Cordray).
219 See, for example, DC Denison, Deal Offers Mortgage Relief for Thousands, Boston
Globe B7 (Aug 10, 2011) (announcing the $125 million settlement reached by AG Martha
Coakley with mortgage companies engaged in fraudulent practices); Leslie Wayne, GoBetween Tied Funds to Carlyle, NY Times B1 (May 15, 2009) (reporting on the $20 million
settlement between the Carlyle Group and AG Andrew Cuomo). Eliot Spitzer, New York's
former AG, was the prototype for aggressive, headline-grabbing litigation activity. See, for
example, Press Release, Invesco and AIM Settle Mutual Fund Timing Cases, New York State
Attorney General (Sept 7, 2004), online at http://www.ag.ny.gov/media-center/2004/sep
/sep7c_.04.html (visited Jan 10, 2012) (reporting on the $450 million settlement with the Invesco
Funds Group and AIM Advisors involving illegal market timing); Brooke A. Masters and Carrie
Johnson, Prudentialto Pay $600 Million to Avoid Fund Trial,Wash Post D1 (Aug 29,2006).
220 See, for example, Editorial, The Pay-to-Sue Business, Wall St J A14 (Apr 16, 2009);
Adam Liptak, A Deal for the Public: If You Win, You Lose, NY Times A10 (July 9,2007).
221 See, for example, Barry Meier and Richard A. Oppel Jr, States' Big Suits against
Industry Bring Battle on Contingency Fees, NY Times Al (Oct 15, 1999):
The staggering fees prompted public uproar, particularly in Texas, where one lawyer,
Marc D. Murr of Houston, who appeared to play little role in the litigation, sought
$260 million in fees. Faced by a state investigation, Mr. Murr, whose request was
supported by the former Texas Attorney General who hired him, backed down.
222 See, for example, Kan Stat Ann § 75-37,135 (requiring any fee agreement between the
AG and a private lawyer where the fees "reasonably may exceed $1,000,000" to be disclosed to
the legislative budget committee for public hearing and approval); ND Cent Code § 54-12-08.1
(requiring an "emergency commission" to approve any contingency fee contract between the
AG and outside counsel where the amount in controversy exceeds $150,000). See also Meier
and Oppel, States' Big Suits againstIndustry Bring Battle on Contingency Fees, NY Times at Al
(cited in note 221):
As part of a business counteroffensive against the trend, the United States Chamber of
Commerce will soon begin an intensive lobbying campaign to get legislatures to
drastically restrict states' use of contingency lawyers.... Republican lawmakers with the
backing of business groups passed legislation [in Texas] requiring the State Attorney
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George W. Bush to ban the use of contingency fee agreements in
federal contracts with outside counsel.'
But cooler heads have since prevailed. The Louisiana AG,
James "Buddy" Caldwell, recently received permission from the
state legislature to hire private attorneys to handle litigation against

BP and others arising out of the Deep Water Horizon disaster. '
Standing firm in the face of critics who cited "pay-to-play" scandals
elsewhere, State AG Caldwell emphasized the superior resources of
private law firms and observed that, without private contingency
counsel, "[i]t's like we've got a slingshot trying to take down a big ol'
giant.""2 5 Caldwell explained: "[Y]ou've got to get the best lawyers.
They're going to have lawyers that charge $1,000 an hour. I want
something close to a level playing field."" 6Other AGs have similarly
turned to private outside counsel. 7
In any event, AGs can easily protect themselves from a "tobacco
problem" by negotiating to place some sort of limits on fees. Such
capping arrangements -often couched as a fee of x percent but not
to exceed y times the ordinary hourly fees-are not unusual in
private contracts, and they need not be particularly draconian to
avoid the sort of "windfall" situation that is capable of drawing
populist ire.
A more significant political obstacle might be electoral politics
in a post-Citizens United era.' The ability of business groups to
amass war chests targeting consumer-friendly AGs may prove
formidable in some states."9 And while trial lawyers are likely to
General to have contingency-fee contracts approved by a board appointed by top state
officials. Legal fees could not exceed $4,000 an hour.
223 Executive Order 13433, 3 CFR § 217 (May 16,2007).
224 Wilkins, 2010 Mich St L Rev at 426-27 (cited in note 205), citing Bill Barrow, House
Committee Approves Hiring Lawyers for Gulf Oil Spill Cases, Times-Picayune (June 15, 2010),
online at http:I/www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/06lhouse-committee-approves
_hirin.html (visited Jan 10, 2012).
225 Bill Barrow, House Committee (cited in note 224).
226 Bill Barrow, Attorney General Seeks Cash, Power to Hire Outside Lawyers in Fight
against Gulf Oil Spill, Times-Picayune (May 31, 2010), online at http://www.nola.com/news/gulfoil-spill/index.ssf/2010/05/attomeygeneraLseeks-cash.po.html (visited May 3, 2012) (reporting
AG Caldwell's view that he "needs more firepower to hire outside help" because "' [wle just
don't have the horses' to handle such a complex case").
227 See Wilkins, 2010 Mich St L Rev at 430 (cited in note 205) (listing suits "against the
manufacturers of lead paint, HMOs and other health care providers, brewers and distillers, fast
food chains, and in the years since the housing market crash, mortgage lenders" as common
cases in which private lawyers are brought in to conduct litigation against private parties).
228 Citizens United, 130 S Ct at 913 (lifting ban on campaign spending by corporations).
229 See, for example, Chris McGann, Chamber Tells Why It Paid for Anti-Senn Ads,
Seattle P-I Al (Sept 14, 2004) (reporting that the US Chamber of Commerce spent over
$1.5 million to defeat Deborah Senn's campaign to be elected state AG in Washington because
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provide a counterweight to some extent, these are perilous waters:
AGs should expect zero tolerance for "pay to play" regimes in which
campaign contributions are, or appear to be, reciprocated by
contingent fee engagements.' Given the attention paid to this issue
in the defense community,"' it will be critical to distinguish perfectly
permissible contributions by trial lawyer groups from donations

she was viewed as "anti-business"); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Judicial Hellholes, Lawsuit
Climates and Bad Social Science: Lessons from West Virginia, 110 W Va L Rev 1097, 1127
(2008), quoting U.S. Chamber of Commerce Failed to Report Electioneering Spending and
Grants, Public Citizen Asks IRS to Investigate (Public Citizen Oct 31, 2006), online at
http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/pressroomredirect.cfn?ID=2305 (visited Jan 10, 2012) ("In
2002, the [US] Chamber [of Commerce] said it planned to spend $40 million on political
campaigns, divided equally between congressional and state-level attorneys general and
judicial races."); Jonathan D. Salant, Pro-business Groups Invest in Races for Attorney
General, Wash Post A6 (Oct 29, 2006) (reporting that businesses fearing "activist" AGs spent
millions to try to have them unseated); Robert Lenzner and Matthew Miller, Buying Justice,
Forbes (July 21, 2003), online at http://www.forbes.com/freeforbes/2003/0721/064.html (visited
Jan 10, 2012) (reporting that the US Chamber of Commerce spent "$100 million since 2000" in
campaigns "taking aim at state attorneys general," and had "prevailed in 11 attorney general
races").
230 See, for example, Leah Godesky, State Attorneys General and Contingency Fee
Arrangements: An Affront to the Neutrality Doctrine?, 42 Colum J L & Soc Probs 587, 595
(2009), quoting Judge William H. Pryor, ex-AG of Alabama, as stating that contingency fee
contracts with private lawyers can result in "outright corruption for political supporters of the
officials who negotiated the [clontracts"), quoting Brief of Chamber of Commerce of the
United States of America and the American Tort Reform Association as Amici Curiae,
Oklahoma v Tyson Food, Inc, No 4:05-cv-00329, *6 (ND OK filed June 12, 2007) (available on
Westlaw at 2007 WL 5366927); Mark A. Behrens and Andrew W. Crouse, The Evolving Civil
Justice Reform Movement: Procedural Reforms Have Gained Steam, but Critics Still Focus on
Arguments of the Past, 31 U Dayton L Rev 173, 180-81 (2006) (providing examples of possible
improprieties by Kansas and Texas state AGs); John Fund, Cash In, Contracts Out: The
Relationship between State Attorneys General and the Plaintiffs' Bar 6-11, US Chamber
Institute for Legal Reform (Oct 14, 2004), online at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com
/getjilr-doc.php?id=820 (visited Jan 10, 2012) (citing numerous examples of AGs awarding
contingency fee contracts to campaign contributors).
231 See, for example, John Beisner, Jessica Davidson Miller, and Terrell McSweeny,
Bounty Hunters on the Prowl: The Troubling Alliance of State Attorneys General and Plaintiffs'
Lawyers, US Chamber Institute for Legal Reform 3-8 (May 26, 2005), online at
http://www.instituteforlegareform.com/get-ilr doc.php?id=939 (visited Jan 10, 2012); Douglas
F. McMeyer, Lise T. Spacapan, and Robert W. George, Contingency Fee Plaintiffs' Counsel
and the Public Good?, In-House Defense Quarterly 13 (Winter 2011), online at
httpJ/www.huschblackwelLcom/files/Publication/d7a63e97.c943-4ce9-9a5a-aa6la6bfdd92/Presentation
/PublicationAttachment/026393d9-9aaa-48aa-bc82-abb484163812/McMeyerFinal_0611.pdf
(visited Jan 12, 2012); Lisa Rickard, State Attorneys General and the CFPA, Free Enterprise
(Sept 22, 2009), online at http://freeenterprise.com2009/09/state-attorneys-general-and-thecfpa.html (visited Jan 10, 2012):
While the [US] Chamber [of Commerce] has a number of serious concerns about the
proposed Consumer Financial Protection Act, not least among them is the probability of
increased litigation from some state attorneys general, who, with new federal authority to
enforce the CFPA, will be hiring private plaintiffs' lawyers on contingency fee contracts.
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made by specific law firms that have economic interests in the AG's
office.'
CONCLUSION

Parens patriae litigation may just be poised for a qualitatively
new role in the enforcement landscape. Certainly, in the wake of
Concepcion, state AGs will be on the receiving end of vastly more,
and better, large-scale litigation opportunities than ever before.
Many cases that would previously have been filed as class actions
will, instead, be presented to state AGs. To be sure, there is nothing

new about private counsel seeking to enlist AGs to spearhead
litigation that private parties are ill-suited to bring; the lead paint
nuisance cases are a good example. 3 But thanks to class action

waivers and other developments in the law of class actions, private
plaintiffs are suddenly barred from bringing many of the cases that
most broadly affect US consumers and employees.
Until now, most AGs have been sparing in their use of parens
patriae and, especially, in the employment of private counsel.' But
as companies move to exempt themselves from exposure to private

collective litigation for the broadly dispersed harms they inflict, it is
reasonable for the electorate to expect state AGs to embrace their
role as guardians of the public welfare. Whether the political benefits
of embracing this role will outweigh the political risks remains to be
seen.

232 Toward these ends, the American Legislative Exchange Council in 2008 proposed
model legislation entitled the Private Attorney Retention Sunshine Act. The legislation
requires "an open and competitive bidding process prior to the awarding of any state contract
for legal services," and if "a contract is issued in an amount over $1 million, the Act calls for at
least one legislative public hearing on the contract." Godesky, 42 Colum J L & Soc Probs
at 609-11 (cited in note 230) (describing the reforms to the contingency fee system provided by
the Sunshine legislation). To date, the legislation has been adopted in ten states-Arizona,
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Minnesota, North Dakota, Texas, and
Virginia-and is being considered in Georgia, Iowa, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina. See Private Attorney Retention
Sunshine Act: State Activity on Relevant Legislation, American Legislative Exchange Council,
online at http://www.alec.org/initiatives/sunshine-in-state-attorney-contracts/ (visited Jan 10,
2012). See also Behrens and Crouse, 31 U Dayton L Rev at 182-83 (cited in note 230).
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See note 227.

See McMeyer, Spacapan, and George, Contingency Fee Plaintiffs' Counsel and the
Public Good? at appendix B (cited in note 231).
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